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Abstract
We draw from documented characteristics of the biopharmaceutical industry to construct a
model where two firms can choose to outsource R&D to an external unit, and/or engage in in-
ternal R&D, before competing in a final market. We investigate the distribution of profits among
market participants, and the incentives to coordinate outsourcing activities or to integrate R&D
and production. Consistent with the empirical evidence, we find that the sign and magnitude of
an aggregate measure of direct (inter-firm) and indirect (through the external unit) technological
externalities drives the distribution of industry profits, with higher returns to the external unit
when involved in development (clinical trials) than in early-stage research (drug discovery). In
the latter case, the delinkage of investment incentives from industry value, together with the abil-
ity of firms to transfer risks to the external unit, imply a vulnerability of early-stage investors’
returns to negative shocks, and the likely abandonment of projects with economic and medical
value. We also find that competition in the equity market makes a buyout by one of the two firms
more profitable to a research biotech than to a clinical services unit, and can stimulate early-stage
investments. However, this long-term incentive can be minimal, notably if the superior efficiency
of outsourced operations originates from economies of scope that can hardly be exploited when
a firm takes control of the external unit exclusively for itself. R&D outsourcing thus does not al-
ways qualify as a relevant pathway to address the declining productivity in innovation that has
characterized the industry over several decades.
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Keywords: research; development; biotechnology; pharmaceuticals; externalities.
∗Universite´ de Lille & LEM (CNRS), France.
†EMLYON business school & GATE (CNRS), France. Corresponding author (versaevel@em-lyon.com).
1
1 Introduction
A decline in R&D (research and development) productivity has been observed in the biopharmaceu-
tical industry over several decades (Munos, 2009; Pammolli et al., 2011). While the number of new
molecular entities and biologics that are approved annually by the US Food and Drug Administra-
tion (FDA) has remained around the same level since 1950, when measured per billion US dollars
spent on R&D this number has halved roughly every 9 years (Scannell et al., 2012). The scale of
the productivity problem can be gauged by considering changes in the average full cost estimate of
bringing a new compound to the market. This estimate is $451 million in DiMasi et al. (1991), $1,031
million in DiMasi et al. (2003), and $2,558 million in DiMasi et al. (2016).1
There is also evidence that pharmaceutical companies that engage in internal R&D increasingly
outsource specific tasks: “The global drug discovery outsourcing market was USD 14.9 billion (2014)
and is expected to reach USD 25 billion by 2018, while the market for CRO [contract research organiza-
tion]-conducted clinical trials was USD 23.1 billion (2014) and is expected to increase to USD 35.8 bil-
lion by 2020 ”(Schuhmacher et al., 2016, p. 8). It is believed in the industry that R&D outsourcing can
reduce costs by increasing efficiency in the discovery and testing steps toward new medicines (e.g.,
Taylor et al., 2016; Sancheti et al., 2018). On the demand side of the R&D market, the tasks that phar-
maceutical companies choose to contract out cover a large range of activities, including target vali-
dation, genetic engineering, chemical synthesis, compound screening, lead compounds evaluation,
preclinical studies, and clinical (in-human) trials. On the supply side, science-based biotech firms
specialize in early-stage research activities for the discovery of new chemical or biological molecules,
while CROs deliver later-stage development services for the safety and efficacy assessment of drug
or vaccine candidates.
Despite the observed decline in R&D productivity, as gross margins in medication markets have
evolved in parallel with R&D spending, the net profit returns in the biopharmaceutical industry
have remained persistently high at the aggregated level since the early 1960s (Scherer, 2001, 2010).
However, the average profitability of biotech units that specialize in the discovery of new treatments
1Here we refer to studies based on the same methodology to estimate costs, which include out-of-pocket R&D costs
and time cost (i.e., cost of capital). The estimates in DiMasi et al. (1991, 2003) have been updated to US$ 2011 prices in
Mestre-Ferrandiz et al. (2012), and the one in DiMasi et al. (2016) is in 2013 prices. The three estimates are based on
compound-level data, with initial human testing that occurred during the periods 1970-1982, 1983-1994, and 1995-2007,
respectively.
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or preventives has remained low since the emergence of genetic engineering in the 1970s (Pisano,
2006a, 2010). Biotech firms also face greater financial risk and are more sensitive to policy shocks
that affect expected future profitability than the average large pharmaceutical company (Golec and
Vernon, 2009). A recent empirical analysis of a comprehensive sample of 1,066 companies in the pe-
riod 1930-2015 confirms these observations by disaggregating the financial performance across the
pharmaceutical and biotech subsectors: “[o]ur empirical results show that investments in the phar-
maceutical industry have outperformed the broader stock market over a long period of time, whereas
investments in the biotech industry have underperformed the market” (Thakor et al., 2017, p. 1154),
and the performance differential appears especially pronounced after 2001. Moreover, by decompos-
ing the risk of the pharma and biotech portfolios into factors arising from general economic condi-
tions (systematic risk) and factors that are unique to the individual company or project (idiosyncratic
risk), it is found that the majority of the total risk for the pharmaceutical subsector is of the systematic
type while, in contrast, “the biotech portfolio has both systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk, with a
much higher idiosyncratic risk than in the pharma portfolio” (p. 1153). Moreover, the systematic
risk in biotech firms is as large as – and in some periods can even be substantially higher than –
that of the pharma companies. The latter empirical analysis does not include the subsector of CROs
involved in the clinical assessment of drug or vaccine candidates. For these organizations, business
information abounds that describes more favourable financial conditions, such as “high visibility of
revenues, excess cash generation, strong balance sheets and limited exposure to a number of risks
that commonly affect biopharma companies ...” (Bali et al., 2013, p. 3). As a consequence, unlike
biotech firms, “CROs have historically traded at a 21% premium to the S&P 500 over the past 14
years” (Wilson et al., 2016, p. 41).
How does the distribution of industry profits among pharma companies, biotech firms, and
CROs, relate to the functioning of the R&D market? Can technological characteristics of contracted-
out operations explain the low average profitability of biotech units, and the higher financial returns
of CROs? Are the risks inherent to discovery and clinical development activities mitigated by out-
sourcing contracts? What are the consequences for early-stage investment incentives? In order to an-
swer these questions, we draw on documented characteristics of the biopharmaceutical industry to
construct a model in which a for-profit upstream external unit (e.g., a biotech startup, or a contract re-
search organization) conducts specific R&D tasks as solicited non-cooperatively by two downstream
firms (big pharma), which also run R&D operations internally before competing in a final market.
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The external unit interacts with the two firms by responding to their contract offers, and can choose
to serve both firms, only one, or none. The firms can substitute internal resources for some or all of
the external unit’s operations, and their contract offers reflect multi-stage strategic interactions in the
intermediate R&D market and in the final product market. Overall, the formal analysis leads to new
insights on the functioning of R&D outsourcing and its implications for biopharmaceutical firms and
their external partners, with strong and intelligible connections to the recent empirical evidence on
the relation between contracted-out and in-house technological activities, on the nature of knowl-
edge externalities in discovery and (distinctively) clinical development, and on merger activity in the
equity market.
More specifically, our main results establish simple conditions on the model primitives for the
total equilibrium R&D benefits to be either fully appropriated by the two firms, or partially retained
by the external unit. These conditions, which can explain the persistently low average profitability
of biotech firms, relate to indirect and direct technological externalities. There are indirect techno-
logical externalities if the cost of R&D, as conducted by the external unit for the two firms, reflects
economies or diseconomies of scope. There are direct technological externalities if some of the knowl-
edge received or produced by a firm impacts the gross profit of its competitor. We connect the sign
and magnitude of these externalities with the distribution of profits among participants in the inter-
mediate market for R&D.
Situations of positive indirect (through the external unit) and direct (inter-firm) externalities cor-
respond mainly to early-stage discovery activities, in which biotech units are typically involved, and
where economies of scope across research projects and significant inter-firm knowledge spillovers
have been evidenced in the empirical literature (Henderson and Cockburn, 1996).2 In the theoretical
context of our model, we find that the external unit exactly breaks even, and hence investors have
no positive incentive to engage financial resources, precisely in circumstances where outsourcing the
tasks of the most fundamental nature can reduce the costs of discovering new medicines. We also
demonstrate that downstream firms can use risk-proof contract offers in order to transfer – at least
partly – the burden of unfavorable realizations of uncertainty to the external unit, via adjusted pay-
ments. With an expected payoff at the upstream stage equal to zero, an unfavorable realization of
uncertainty then implies a negative return, and thus possibly leads the external unit to shut down,
2In a survey, Hernandez-Villafuerte et al. (2017) observe that, although the evidence is mixed, in biomedical and health
research the literature more often points to the existence of positive economies of scope than diseconomies.
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although its activities generate a positive – and possibly very high – industry profit. This (interme-
diate) market failure outcome suggests that protection measures for the external unit (e.g., a lower
bound to milestone payments in case of adverse events) can be necessary to avoid the abandonment
of socially valuable research projects.
However, in our model, when an aggregate measure of technological externalities is negative,
the external unit can appropriate a positive share of total profits that can be derived analytically. In
that case the downstream firms earn only their marginal contribution to the industry value, and the
payoff to the external unit depends on the magnitude of externalities. This situation is consistent with
the empirical studies that identify diseconomies of scope and nonexistent spillovers in the late-phase
clinical trials of candidate drugs (Danzon et al. 2005; Macher and Boerner, 2006), such as conducted
by specialized CROs. Then the positive profit to the external unit is an effect of competition between
the contract offers of the two firms for the orientation of R&D resources toward specific needs. The
intensity of that competition depends on the nature of R&D activities – as conducted by the external
unit and by the two firms – and then on the effect of these activities on downstream cost and demand
characteristics, which in the end also impact final market interactions.
We also connect the technological conditions that drive the distribution of R&D benefits to the
firms’ incentives to participate in the equity market, where big pharma companies acquire special-
ized innovative units involved in promising research or clinical development programs. For exam-
ple, in the oncology domain, AbbVie agreed to buy Pharmacyclics for $21 billion in 2015, and Pfizer
acquired Medivation for $14 billion in 2016. Such acquisitions, which substitute for contractual out-
sourcing relations, are viewed by industry leaders as another response to the declining R&D produc-
tivity problem (Comanor and Scherer, 2013). Still the high transaction prices observed in the equity
market suggest that pharmaceutical firms pay more for R&D by acquiring an external unit than by
contracting with it as a partner, or by carrying out the R&D internally (Pisano, 2015). Acquisitions
usually conclude a bidding contest where several big pharma rivals compete for the same buyout
target,3 leading to equity valuations often considered excessive by industry analysts and experts.4
3For example, “[f]or several days, Johnson & Johnson was considered the most likely acquirer of Pharmacyclics ... But
AbbVie stepped in with a higher bid ...” (www.nytimes.com, March 5, 2015). In the same vein, “AstraZeneca Plc and Pfizer
Inc. are among firms considering a counteroffer for Medivation Inc., challenging Sanofi’s $9.3 billion bid for the company
...” (www.bloomberg.com, April 29, 2016).
4To illustrate, “AbbVie shares were down 3% in Thursday trading, as some investors and analysts expressed con-
cern the company was overpaying for Pharmacyclics ...” (www.wsj.com, May 5, 2015); and “GlaxoSmithKline CEO An-
drew Witty questioned the ... valuations of recent deals” ... and stated that “[s]ome of these valuations look stretched.”
(www.firstwordpharma.com, May 11, 2015).
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Two categories of cases are identified that depend on the ability of firms to bid or not for the exter-
nal unit, in relation to financial, managerial, or governance constraints of all kinds. If such constraints
are binding, either positive technological externalities dominate and the firms remain independent,
or negative externalities lead the firms to choose to coordinate horizontally their R&D outsourcing
(as in Majewski, 2004). Otherwise, should the firms be unable to commit to not unilaterally consid-
ering vertical integration, one of them does acquire the external unit. Whether one or the other firm
is the acquirer occurs with equiprobability, independently of firm asymmetries. The main outcome
is that the competition for the control of the external unit leads to overbidding (an issue discussed in
Higgins and Rodriguez, 2006), although the premium can be nil in the case of negative externalities
(diseconomies of scope and inexistant inter-firm spillovers), as characteristic of late-stage develop-
ment tasks. We thus obtain that principally biotech founders engaged in early-stage research – unlike
owners of contract research organizations – may reappropriate in the equity market part of the value
transferred to their sponsors in the R&D market.
Our formal analysis relates to a stream of theoretical papers – starting with Aghion and Tirole
(1994), Anton and Yao (1994), Bhattacharya and Guriev (2006, 2013) – which investigate a variety
of issues that pertain to R&D outsourcing, although most models in that stream of literature adopt
a general approach with no specific reference to the biopharmaceutical domain. Our approach is
complementary to recent analyses by Spulber (2013) and Allain et al. (2015) that characterize the
connection between the intensity of downstream competition – which depends on the number of
client firms – and upstream incentives to engage in R&D operations. As in Spulber (2013), in our
model an appropriability problem may lead to integrate R&D and production vertically, and as in
Allain et al. (2015) the vertical division of labor in R&D operations is driven by the nature of compe-
tition among client firms. A distinctive feature of our model is that the intensity of competition is a
consequence of the exact effects of external and internal R&D operations on cost and demand condi-
tions. We also share with Ho (2009) and Lai et al. (2009) the assumption that the downstream firms
write contract offers, to which the external unit responds, and which can lead to multi-contracting.
Moreover, in our model the firms condition their payments on a measure of the external unit’s opera-
tions, as in Vencatachellum and Versaevel (2009). It follows that the external unit’s operations are not
conducted before the client firms’ choice of payment schemes, consistently with contractual situations
in the biopharmaceutical context. These payment schemes are the firms’ instruments that determine
the equilibrium distribution of industry profit among contracting parties.
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As the firms’ non-cooperative choices of payment schemes depend on technological characteris-
tics of R&D activities, our model specifications also relate to the empirical evidence on the existence
of economies of scale or scope in early-stage research and later-stage clinical development. By using
data collected at the firm level and at the level of individual R&D projects, Henderson and Cockburn
(1996) find economies of scope and significant knowledge spillovers in early-stage drug “discovery”
tasks (those on with biotech units typically focus). Conversely, Danzon et al. (2005) and Macher and
Boerner (2006) identify diseconomies of scope and nonexistent spillovers in the late-phase clinical
trials of candidate medicines (the “development” activities that are usually outsourced to specialized
CROs). Our main theoretical propositions clearly echo these contrasted empirical results, and show
their relevance for explaining the distribution of industry profits between an external unit and its
client firms.
The paper is organized as follows. Characteristics of the biopharmaceutical industry are pre-
sented in Section 2, in connection to the model specifications introduced in Section 3. The distribution
of industry profits is characterized in Section 4, and incentives to shift to a more integrated structure
are investigated in Section 5. Final remarks are in Section 6.
2 The Industry Context
We derive our theoretical results from model specifications that are carefully related to documented
characteristics of the biopharmaceutical “market for technology” (Arora et al., 2001, 2004a), where the
industry usually divides research and development activities into two sets. The early-stage research
(“R”) consists of the discovery of new chemical compounds, vaccine candidates, or other biologics.
The later-stage development (“D”) tasks aim at assessing the safety and efficacy of the therapeutic or
prophylactic properties of a candidate medicine on increasingly large populations of individuals.
Outsourced R&D activities include early-stage research in the biotechnology field, where from
the early years onward, “[b]ecause different commercial products were based on similar basic tech-
nologies, the costs ... could be shared by clients” (Pisano, 1991, p. 241) and then “[v]irtually every
new entrant ... formed at least one, and usually several, contractual relationships with established
pharmaceutical ... companies” (Pisano, 2006a, p. 87).5 A historical example involves the pioneer-
5According to Higgins (2007), who uses a large data set of alliances in the biopharmaceutical industry, from 1994 to 2001
each biotechnology firms had on average six alliance partnerships with large pharmaceutical firms.
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ing biotech firm Genentech, which started collaborations with Ely Lilly in 1978 for the synthesis of
human insulin, and with Hoffman-LaRoche the same year for the synthesis of interferons. A more
recent example involves CureVac, which contracted with Crucell (a Johnson & Johnson company) in
2013, and with Sanofi Pasteur in 2014, for the funding of R&D operations toward prophylactic vac-
cines. Another recent example involves Moderna Therapeutics, which partnered with AstraZeneca
in 2016, and with Merck a few months later, for the co-discovery and development of RNA-based
candidates for the treatment or prevention of a range of cancers. In our model, accordingly, an exter-
nal unit can serve up to two client firms simultaneously.6
Another important characteristic of the current market for biotechnology is that established phar-
maceutical firms do not only give a biotech firm (external unit) access to finance and to manufactur-
ing or marketing resources, they also operate internal biotechnology functions. The situation was
different when the biotechnology market emerged in the late 1970s. At that time there was a clear
dichotomy in the R&D focus of suppliers and buyers. On the supply side, a typical new biotech
firm used advances in biological sciences – e.g., recombinant DNA technology – for the design of
a therapeutic agent. On the demand side, the established pharmaceutical firms, whose technolog-
ical competence focused on the random screening of compounds against disease targets, procured
research in the market for biotechnology before engaging in clinical development. Since then, the
largest pharmaceutical firms have acquired capabilities in cell and molecular biology (Galambos and
Sturchio, 1998; Rydzewski, 2008), so that the dichotomy has eroded: “[e]stablished firms have em-
braced biological approaches, including genomics, to drug discovery, while ‘biotech firms’ employ
chemistry” (Pisano, 2006a; p. 17).
Outsourced R&D also relates to late-stage development activities. Once a new compound, or
a candidate vaccine, has been discovered, and tested in animal models, it must go through clinical
trials conducted on human subjects. These trials need to produce evidence of safety and efficacy, as
required for regulatory approval by government agencies (e.g., the FDA) before market introduction.
There are three phases that involve increasingly large samples of subjects (from a few dozen in phase
1 to, in case of success, several hundred in phase 2, and then to several thousand subjects in phase
3). As in the case of biotechs, a CRO that supplies clinical trial services can enter in simultaneous
6Although the biotech and CRO industries are highly fragmented (see Argyres and Liebeskind, 2002, and Getz, 2007,
respectively), the specification that only one external unit faces two client firms is consistent with the observation that
several big pharma companies usually compete for a differentiated technology or expertise as specifically supplied by a
given entity among several others (a case of monopolistic competition).
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contractual relationships with several clients. For example, Parexel entered in 2011 into multi-year
contractual agreements with both Merck and Pfizer. The contracting firms do not restrict their strate-
gies to either make or buy clinical trial services as “[f]or a given study, sponsors can choose to retain
some functions in house while contracting out others” (Azoulay, 2004; p. 1594). By outsourcing the
latter tasks the firms attempt to benefit from economies of scale and scope (Macher and Boerner,
2006), and thereby to reduce their clinical trial costs, which are estimated at around US$220 million
for a new drug (Mestre-Ferrandiz, Sussex, and Towse, 2012).7
In our model, the respective efforts of the external unit and its client firms are endogenous, so
that the vertical division of R&D activities can occur at any point between total outsourcing and full
integration. This specification is consistent with the observation that the collaboration of big pharma
firms with biotech units or clinical trial providers creates joint inputs across the two sides of the
contractual relationship, with an exact balance that might vary significantly on a case by case basis.
The large pharmaceutical firms on the demand side of the intermediate market for technology
are likely to design the contracts that organize the relationship with an external supplier of discovery
activities or of clinical trial services. This is explained by the fact that, when internal resources are
available, the capacity of established pharmaceutical firms to “go for it alone” – though possibly at a
higher cost – increases their bargaining power (Arora et al., 2004b). Other factors include the severe
financial constraints faced by specialized biotech units (Lerner and Merges, 1998; Golec and Vernon,
2009), together with a high rate of entry on the fragmented supply side (Rothaermel, 2001; Argyres
and Liebeskind, 2002) while incumbents on the demand side remain highly concentrated. Although
the latter structural features describe a “buyer’s market”, we show that they cannot fully explain
the persistently low average profitability of biotech firms since the late 1970s (Pisano, 2006a, 2010).
Indeed, in the analysis that follows we identify circumstances where the external unit appropriates
the total industry profit, for any probability of success, with client firms that behave as principals and
are no less informed than the common independent contractor.
R&D contracts can incorporate complex clauses to fine tune the financial mechanism (equity par-
ticipation, milestone payments, licensing fees, royalties, ...)8 with the technology or services supplied
7The out-of-pocket cost of clinical testing depends on the number of patients required to collect sufficient data as de-
manded from regulatory agencies. It is even higher in the case of preventive vaccine candidates, as the size of human
subject test samples is often larger than for drugs (Scherer, 2011; Keith et al., 2013).
8In practice, biotech firms typically receive an upfront fee, milestone payments conditioned on the occurrence of a pre-
determined event, and sales-based royalties if their intellectual property is in-licensed by the downstream partner, while
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(or not) by the external unit to other client firms. Non-compete clauses delineate the know-how or
expertise that the external unit may or may not use with or provide to a third party, except as ex-
pressly notified.9 For example, in an early-stage agreement between the pharma company Glaxo and
the Canadian research unit BioChem, the latter “shall have the right to contract with third parties
for the performance of work, or the provision of consulting services, in connection with the spon-
sored research program, provided that Glaxo shall have the opportunity to review, comment on and
approve any such proposed contract prior to its execution”(p. 9).10 Other clauses modulate the pay-
ments received by the external unit from the pharma sponsor in connection to the technology that can
be supplied to a competitor. To illustrate, a research, development, and license agreement between
the pharma company Bristol-Myers Squibb (BMS) and the biotech Ligand Pharmaceuticals (Ligand)
stipulates that “[i]n the event that ... Ligand or a Ligand Affiliate, or a Third Party with whom Ligand
had collaborated with respect to the development of a Competing Product ... sell such Competing
Product in any country in the Territory in which BMS ... is then marketing a Product, ... then ... all
royalty rates payable by BMS in each such country shall be reduced by *** during the period that
both such products are marketed in such country”(pp. 27-28).11 Accordingly, in our model each firm
can condition its payment on the verifiable operations conducted inside the external unit, including
those that relate to a third party.12 This assumption does not mean that a technology received from
the external unit cannot partly benefit a competitor. Unsolicited and non-contractible knowledge
spillovers, both through the external unit and across firms, are introduced in the analysis.13
Circumstances have been studied in the economics literature where a research unit can (re)sell se-
cretly its technology, and is more knowledgeable than its downstream clients.14 In the biopharmaceu-
CROs usually receive a negotiated fee for development services.
9Non-compete clauses typically include a “right of first refusal” (Folta, 1998; Hagedoorn and Hesen, 2007) that allows
a firm to purchase the rights – or only a selection – to R&D outcomes before such an option is offered to other firms.
10The features of this contractual agreement, dated Jan. 1990, are discussed in Robinson and Stuart (2000).
11The contract, dated January 1st 1990, is available at: http://contracts.onecle.com/alpha, where the signs *** refer to
undisclosed confidential information.
12The common agency model in Section 3 is thus of the public kind (Martimort, 2007). This specification, in line with the
stylized facts presented in section 2, differs from most papers that focus on consumer goods markets where less sophis-
ticated non-compete clauses, hardly verifiable activities, and various antitrust regulations can justify the assumption that
a principal can contract exclusively on what it specifically receives from the agent, with no possible connection between
payments and the other activities of the agent that benefit a competitor (e.g., Bernheim and Whinston, 1998).
13In Cohen et al. (2000) survey data show that firms in the pharmaceutical domain rely more on patents as a protection
mechanism than in any other industries. Patenting is an important source technological spillovers, as it “involves a leakage
of a certain portion of the knowledge to the public in the process of filing a patent application”(Bhattacharya and Guriev,
2006, p. 1114).
14For example, in Bhattacharya and Guriev (2006) an external unit can sell its technology to one of two client firms, then
secretly to a competitor. In Bhattacharya and Guriev (2013) the external unit also chooses a non-verifiable research effort
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tical context, secret reselling is unlikely when biotech firms and clinical trial suppliers alike enhance
their reputation by communicating on their contractual partners and on the content of agreements.15
It can also be the case that pharma firms with internal R&D operations are more informed on the
technological potential of a research program than an external unit engaged in the “least intimate”
form of fee-for-service agreement (Pisano, 2006a, p. 108), for example to perform systematic tests on a
compounds library, or than a CRO involved in the most “routinized part” (Shuchman, 2007, p. 1367)
of clinical trials services. So in our theoretical framework the two firms are not less competent than
the external unit, and are not threatened by some form of misbehavior. Our model specifications
are rather motivated by the observation that, in science-based businesses, “[p]rofound and persis-
tent uncertainty, rooted in the limited knowledge of human biological systems and processes, makes
drug R&D highly risky” (Pisano, 2006b; p. 119) to all undertakings. We thus focus on situations of
“symmetric uncertainties” (Arora and Gambardella, 2010, p. 788), where all parties have the same
information on the distribution of a technological parameter, with the state of nature being unknown
at the contracting stage.
3 The Model
In this section we draw on the industry characteristics described above to construct a formal model.
There are two related research and development (R&D) stages in an intermediate market for tech-
nology, and a final product market. Upstream, a for-profit independent unit (hereafter, “the lab”)
conducts R&D activities. Downstream, two firms can outsource R&D to the lab, and/or also con-
duct in-house R&D operations, before competing in the final market where they supply substitutable
products.
Information — The two risk-neutral firms (principals) know the strategies available to the other play-
ers and the related payoffs, while the risk-neutral lab (an agent) needs not know the downstream
cost and demand conditions. Technological uncertainty is described by a parameter θ ∈ Θ whose
distribution is known by all parties, with the state of nature being unknown ex-ante (at the contract-
ing stage, that is before the lab tests technological options) but observable and verifiable ex-post (so
that conditions the value of the technology needed for downstream firms to innovate.
15Moreover, “the identities of partners and descriptions of alliances figure prominently in biotechnology companies’
securities registration statements” when an initial public offering is in preparation (Stuart et al., 1999, p. 327).
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that payments can be made contingent on it and the firms are committed to their contracts).16.
Profit functions — The non-negative external R&D levels, as chosen by the lab specifically for each firm,
are described by x = (x1, x2). The internal R&D levels and the final-market commercial strategies, as
non-cooperatively chosen by the firms, are described by y = (y1, y2) and z = (z1, z2), respectively.17
The lab’s net profit is
v0(x, θ) = t1(x, θ) + t2(x, θ)− f0(x, θ), (1)
where f0 is the lab’s cost, and ti is firm i’s transfer payment, both functions of x and θ. As a transfer
can include an upfront part, it can be rewritten as ti (x, θ) = ti + ki (x, θ), where the function ki
formalizes the fine tuning of each firm’s contingent transfer payment with the technology effectively
supplied by the lab (after uncertainty is realized), as made possible by complex non-compete clauses
and a well-functioning legal environment (see section 2).
Each firm i’s net profit is
vi(x, y, z, θ) = gi
(
xi + yi, xj, yj, z, θ
)− fi (yi, θ)− ti (x, θ) , (2)
i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i, where fi is the firm-specific cost of generating yi internally, and gi is a gross profit
function. In the latter function, firm i’s external and internal R&D levels xi and yi are added as an ar-
gument, which formalizes the technological assumption that all R&D tasks can be a priori performed
either externally or internally. However, the respective equilibrium values are the outcome of distinct
decision processes that can result in external and internal efforts being substitutes or complements
(y∗i can be either decreasing or increasing in xi in Proposition 1, below). The competitor’s variables xj
and yj are arguments of the same function, allowing for technological spillovers received indirectly
through the lab and directly from the competitor. The gross profit also depends on final-market non-
cooperative strategies, z. (Several examples are discussed below that adapt specific algebraic forms
from the R&D literature, with a focus on the effect of uncertainty in Examples 2 and 3.)
Timing — There are four stages, as follows:
(i) The two firms simultaneously and non-cooperatively choose a transfer function ti(x, θ) ≥ 0,
i = 1, 2, offered to the lab as a contract.
16R&D contracts usually include provisions for dispute resolution and point to an external private arbitrager, or to a
specific Court, in case of litigation (e.g., Robinson and Stuart, 2007).
17The argument z can represent prices or quantities, indifferently, or refer to more elaborate competitive interactions.
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Each contract offer thus connects a payment to the lab’s chosen R&D levels for any possible state
of nature, and the specification that payments are non-negative formalizes the assumption that the
institutional environment allows the firms to reduce payments but not to impose penalty fees to the
lab in cases of unsuccesful outcomes. More specifically, in what follows, we assume that both ti and
ki (x, θ) are non-negative.
(ii) The lab accepts either both contract offers simultaneously, or only one, or none, and chooses
the firm-specific R&D levels in x that maximize its expected profit Eθ [v0 (x, θ)].
If accepted contracts include an upfront payment, the lab receives ti from each contracting firm.
At this stage the lab refuses all contracts if they imply a lower benefit than the reservation value
v0 = 0, and it takes only one of the two contracts if this implies a higher benefit than accepting the
two offers.18 Formally, for any given tj offered by firm j, the lab accepts firm i’s contract offer only if
Eθ [v0 (x, θ)] ≥ sup
{
0, max
x
Eθ
[
tj (x, θ)− f0 (x, θ)
]}
, (3)
for some x ≥ (0, 0), i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i. As the firms’ contract offers cannot be negative, in equilibrium
(3) is always exactly satisfied.19 This however does not imply that the equilibrium R&D levels and
transfer functions are symmetric, nor that payments are both positive. It can be the case that firm
i offers a “null” contract, where ti (x, θ) = 0, all (x, θ), and still receives technology, if for example
limiting inter-firm technological spillovers is prohibitively costly for the lab.
(iii) Given the accepted contracts, and on the basis of their expected returns, the firms simultane-
ously and non-cooperatively choose their own internal R&D level yi ≥ 0.
Uncertainty realizes and the state of nature is revealed to all parties.
(iv) Given the realized state of nature, and the outcome of ex-ante chosen R&D levels, the firms
simultaneously and non-cooperatively choose their final-market commercial strategy zi (θ) ≥ 0.
The firms transfer their respective contingent payments ki (x, θ) = ti (x, θ)− ti to the lab.
18As the lab (an agent) can choose to accept only a subset of contracts offered by the two firms (principals), this is a
“delegated common agency” model in the terminology introduced by Bernheim and Whinston (1986a).
19Should in equilibrium the for-profit lab contract exclusively with, say, firm 1, to deliver x˜ ∈
arg maxx Eθ [t1 (x, θ)− f0 (x, θ)], for any non-negative contract offer t2 the lab would earn in expectation
Eθ [t1 (x˜, θ)− f0 (x˜, θ)] < Eθ [t1 (x˜, θ) + t2 (x˜, θ)− f0 (x˜, θ)], a contradiction, so (3) is always satisfied. Moreover,
should the lab supply xˆ to earn the expected payoff Eθ [t1 (xˆ, θ) + t2 (xˆ, θ)− f0 (xˆ, θ)] > Eθ [t1 (x˜, θ)− f0 (x˜, θ)], then
firm 2 would find it profitable to adapt its contract offer to t′2 verifying Eθ
[
t′2 (xˆ, θ)
]
= Eθ [t2 (xˆ, θ)] − ϕ, where
ϕ = Eθ [(t1 (xˆ, θ) + t2 (xˆ, θ)− f0 (xˆ, θ))− (t1 (x˜, θ)− f0 (x˜, θ))], and hence (3) holds with equality.
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The net profits to the lab and to each firm, after contingent payments have been transferred, are
derived from the following equilibrium concept.
Equilibrium concept — For any (x, y) and any realization of θ, henceforth we assume that (i) there exists
a unique final-market Nash equilibrium z∗(x, y, θ), and (ii) for any x, and given the distribution of θ,
there exists a unique internal-R&D stage Nash equilibrium y∗(x), so that we may introduce
g˜i (x, θ) = gi(xi + y∗i (x) , xj, y
∗
j (x) , z
∗(x, y∗(x), θ), θ)− fi (y∗i (x), θ) ,
that is firm i’s concentrated profit net of internal R&D costs. Finally, for any given t = (t1, t2), and
again given the distribution of θ, we denote by X(t) the set of R&D choices that maximize the lab’s
profits in expectation, that is X(t) = arg maxx Eθ [v0 (x (t) , θ)].
The following definitions are needed before introducing the solution concept:
(1) for any x ∈ X(ti, tj) and x′ ∈ X(t′i, tj), firm i’s transfer function ti is a best response to the other
firm’s tj if Eθ [g˜i (x, θ)− ti(x, θ)] ≥ Eθ [g˜i (x′, θ)− t′i(x′, θ)], all t′i;
(2) the transfer function ti is truthful relative to firm i’s payoff with xo if ti(x, θ) = sup{0, g˜i (x, θ)−
[g˜i (xo, θ)− ti (xo, θ)]}.20
The solution concept is the truthful subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (TSPNE). The four-tuple
(t˜, x˜, y˜, z˜) is a TSPNE if, for i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i : (i) z˜ = z∗(x˜, y˜, θ); (ii) y˜ = y∗(x˜); (iii) x˜ ∈ X(t˜); (iv) t˜i is
a best response to t˜j; and (v) t˜i is truthful relative to firm i’s payoff with x˜. It follows that t˜i(x, θ) =
sup{0, g˜i(x, θ)− vi (x˜, y˜, z˜, θ)}, where vi (x˜, y˜, z˜, θ) = [g˜i(x˜, θ)− t˜i(x˜, θ)] is firm i’s equilibrium payoff
as a function of the realization of θ.
Truthfulness is a standard refinement in delegated common agency games, and two properties in
the theoretical literature offer a strong justification for using it (Bernheim and Whinston, 1986b; Laus-
sel and Le Breton, 2001; Martimort, 2007). A first property is that, for any set of transfer offers by any
of the two firms, there exists a truthful strategy in the other firm’s best-response correspondence. A
firm can thus restrict itself to truthful strategies at no cost. A second property is that, when firms
can communicate with each other, all truthful Nash equilibria are coalition-proof. Therefore, the two
20When the gross profit g˜i (x, θ) exceeds the firm’s expected net profit at xo, that is g˜i (xo, θ) − ti (xo, θ), the difference
between ti(x, θ) and ti (xo, θ) is equal to the difference between g˜i (x, θ) and g˜i (xo, θ); otherwise the transfer ti(x, θ) is set
equal to zero. For each θ, on its positive part a truthful contract offer thus exactly reflects firm i’s valuation of x relative to
the value for xo.
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firms’ joint net profits in a TSPNE are not lower than in any other subgame-perfect Nash equilib-
rium.21 The proofs of several propositions in Section 4 present the technical challenge of extending
fundamental results of this common agency literature to a context where firms not only interact as
principals in the intermediate market for external R&D, but also compete in internal technological
decisions and in final-market commercial strategies.22
Technological assumptions — The results in the next sections refer to properties of the lab’s and the
two firms’ expected costs fˆ0 (x) = Eθ [ f0 (x, θ)] and fˆi (x) = Eθ [ fi (xi, θ)], i = 1, 2, which are (weakly)
increasing in their respective arguments, and to the firms’ expected gross profit23 gˆi
(
xi + yi, xj, yj
)
=
Eθ
[
gi(xi + yi, xj, yj, z∗(x, y, θ), θ)
]
, i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i, which is (weakly) increasing in the firm’s own
R&D levels received from the lab or sourced internally (formally ∂gˆi/∂si ≥ 0 where si = xi + yi,
i = 1, 2), but can be decreasing, or not, in the rival’s arguments xj and yj. In any case a firm’s
expected gross profit is (weakly) more impacted by its own R&D, as either purchased from the lab or
produced in-house, than by its rival’s arguments:
∂gˆi
∂xi
≥
∥∥∥∥ ∂gˆi∂xj
∥∥∥∥ , (4)
= ≤
∂gˆi
∂yi
≥
∥∥∥∥∂gˆi∂yj
∥∥∥∥ , (5)
i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i. The vertical comparison of the terms on the RHS of the inequality sign in (4)
and (5) specifies that the R&D leaks emanating from the lab are (weakly) more informative than the
technological spillovers received from the competitor’s internal facilities.24
For both firms, returns to R&D can be either non-increasing (that is, ∂2 gˆi/∂s2i ≤ 0, i = 1, 2), or in-
creasing. The sign of all partial cross-derivatives can also be either non-positive (that is, ∂2 gˆi/∂xi∂xj ≤
0, ∂2 gˆi/∂xi∂yj ≤ 0, ∂2 gˆi/∂yi∂xj ≤ 0, and ∂2 gˆi/∂yi∂yj ≤ 0, i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i), or positive. In all cases, the
21A Nash equilibrium is coalition-proof if it is robust to credible threats of deviations by any subset of principals (for
a formal definition see Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston, 1987). With two principals only, a coalition-proof equilibrium is
Pareto-efficient among principals (Bernheim and Whinston, 1986b). For a discussion on truthfulness as an equilibrium
refinement, see Martimort (2007).
22In appendix the proofs of Lemmas A.1 and A.2 establish formal conditions which, in combination with theorems by
Laussel and Le Breton (2001) and extensions by Billette de Villemeur and Versaevel (2003), lead to Propositions 2, 3, and 5.
23Here we follow Amir et al. (2003) by suggesting that the reduced-form expected gross profit function gˆi can be in-
terpreted as the overall payoff of a multi-stage game in the product market. Then R&D choices are seen as long-term
decisions, on which we focus, followed by a series of short-term final-market decisions.
24In the words of Lai, Riezman, and Wang (2009), “information leakage is much more severe in the absence of internal
controls when R&D is outsourced” (p. 487).
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second-order impact of a firm’s R&D, either produced in-house or received from the lab, on its own
expected gross profit, is higher than the second-order effect of its competitor’s R&D:
∥∥∥∥ ∂2 gˆi∂yi∂xi
∥∥∥∥ ≥ ∥∥∥∥ ∂2 gˆi∂yi∂xj
∥∥∥∥ , (6)
= ≤∥∥∥∥∂2 gˆi∂y2i
∥∥∥∥ ≥ ∥∥∥∥ ∂2 gˆi∂yi∂yj
∥∥∥∥ , (7)
i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i. The vertical comparison of cross-derivatives in (6) and (7) indicates that each firm ’s
marginal expected gross profit is (weakly) more impacted by the technological leakages that emanate
from the lab than from its competitor. These technological assumptions are very mild as they bear
only on expected profit expressions, and they encompass many possible specifications encountered
in the literature (we illustrate with examples of specific algebraic forms in the next section).
Standalone values — The lab can guarantee for itself the value v0 = 0 (a normalization). As for the
firms, to define their outside option suppose that j has exclusive access to the lab, so that their contrac-
tual relationship results in x∗j ∈ arg maxx
{
Eθ [g˜j (x, θ)− f0(x, θ)]
}
. Then firm i can only rely on inter-
nal resources, and it chooses y∗i (x
∗
j ) to earn the standalone expected value vi = Eθ
[
g˜i(x∗j , θ)
]
. Here
x∗j = (x
∗
i , x
∗
j ), with x
∗
i ≥ 0, so firm i can possibly receive technology, without financial compensa-
tion, despite firm j’s exclusive relationship with the lab. For an equilibrium to exist, with technology
outsourcing, it must be the case that v∗i = Eθ [g˜i(x˜, θ)− t˜i(x˜, θ)] ≥ vi, for both firms.25
4 Technological Conditions and Equilibrium Analysis
In this section, we investigate the circumstances in which technology outsourcing either reduces or
stimulates internal R&D levels, before deriving conditions for the lab to appropriate a share of R&D
profits, or to exactly break-even to the benefit of the outsourcing firms.
As a first result, we find that in equilibrium each firm’s internal R&D level y∗i can be substitutable
or a complementary to the level xi received from the lab. The sign of the relation between y∗i and xi
depends on the nature of R&D returns, but not on technological spillovers.
25In the proofs of Propositions 2 and 3 we check that this condition holds in equilibrium (see Appendix A.4).
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Proposition 1 (external/internal R&D) The equilibrium level of a firm’s internal R&D activity y∗i is de-
creasing in the contracted external lab’s activity xi if and only if the gross profit functions gˆi have decreasing
returns in si = xi + yi, i = 1, 2. More formally:
dy∗i
dxi
Q 0⇔ ∂
2 gˆi
∂s2i
Q 0.26 (8)
A first message in this proposition is that whether contracted-out R&D reduces or raises inter-
nal activity does not depend on inter-firm technological spillovers, because the second-order effect
in (8) bears only on each firm i’s own argument si, not on xj or yj, i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i. This property
contrasts with the well-known lesson received from many papers that adopt the analytical frame-
work of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) in order to focus on horizontal technological interactions.
In these papers, the strategic substitutability or complementarity of the firms’ technological choice
variables depends entirely on whether a spillover parameter is low or high, respectively. In our
model, the firms also interact vertically by competing in their contract offers to the external unit. This
vertical interaction appears to dominate the horizontal effects for what regards the substitutabil-
ity/complementarity outcome.
Another message in Proposition 1 is that the relationship between external and internal sourc-
ing is formally ambiguous. This ambiguity is structural, in that it depends on the functional form
of firms’ gross profit. Here contracted-out R&D reduces internal activity if and only if there are de-
creasing returns to the introduction of a new technology in downstream operations. In real-world
circumstances, returns to R&D in the biopharmaceutical domain depend on a number of factors, in-
cluding the therapeutic area (for example, the discovery of new antibiotics does not present the same
challenges as the discovery of a universal vaccine against influenza) or the relative exploratory nature
of a scientific approach (cell therapies against cancer are only emerging, unlike chemotherapy). Our
proposition predicts that situations of decreasing returns imply more aggregation of R&D activities
than with increasing returns, either upstream in external units or downstream in pharma companies.
This result is reminiscent of several recent empirical analyses that indicate a context-specific re-
lationship between external and internal R&D sources in the biopharmaceutical industry. In Hage-
doorn and Wang (2012) the estimated sign of the marginal effect of internal R&D expenditure on
the innovative output is negative, with the marginal returns to internal R&D being possibly lower or
26More specifically, dy
∗
i
dxi
= 0 if and only if either (i) ∂
2 gˆi
∂s2i
= 0, or (ii) ∂
2 gˆi
∂x2i
=
∂2 gˆi
∂xi∂yj
< 0, ∂
2 gˆj
∂x2j
=
∂2 gˆj
∂xj∂xj
< 0, and ∂
2 fˆ j
∂y2j
= 0,
where i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i (see Appendix A.2).
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higher than when technology is sourced externally, reflecting a case of substitutability or complemen-
tarity. In Ceccagnoli et al. (2014), the estimated sign of the partial cross-derivative of an innovation
production function with respect to external and internal R&D expenditure is found to depend on a
series of factors. These empirical investigations and our formal characterization share the conclusion
that external and internal R&D are neither complements not substitutes per se, the exact connection
between the two channels being rather context related, as captured here by the sign of a second-order
effect.
In what follows we build on Proposition 1 by first considering separately situations of non-
increasing returns (∂2 gˆi/∂s2i ≤ 0), before discussing the robustness of our results when we shift to
non-decreasing returns (∂2 gˆi/∂s2i ≥ 0). In either cases, to characterize the distribution of R&D profits
among the intermediate R&D market participants we need defining as a value function the highest
expected joint profit for the lab together with any subset of firms, that is
v (S) = max
x
(
∑
i∈S
Eθ [g˜i (x, θ)− f0(x, θ)]
)
, (9)
where S ∈ {∅, {1}, {2}, {1, 2}}.
We assume that v(∅) = v0 = 0, which describes the no contract situation, and that v ({i}) ≥ vi,
implying that firm i’s exclusive control of the lab dominates its standalone value, i = 1, 2. Hereafter,
for conciseness we denote the maximum expected industry profit v ({1, 2}) by Λ.
The value function v(.) in (9) is instrumental for the caracterization of equilibrium outcomes in
the intermediate market for technology, as it captures the interplay of indirect and direct techno-
logical externalities: there are indirect technological externalities if the lab’s cost f0 of conducting
firm-specific R&D tasks is characterized by economies or diseconomies of scope; there are direct ex-
ternalities if the R&D received or generated by firm i enters in the gross profit function gˆj of its com-
petitor, i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i.27 Indirect (through the lab) and direct (inter-firm) technological externalities
can differ in magnitude and in sign, and an aggregate measure of the combination of both categories
27In (9), recall that g˜i (x, θ) = gi(xi + y∗i (x), xj, y
∗
j (x), z
∗(x, y∗(x), θ), θ) − fi
(
y∗i (x), θ
)
, so that firm i’s profit does not
depend only on the R&D generated by the rival internally (y∗j (x)), but also on the technology received by the latter firm
from the lab (xj).
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of externalities is given by the structural parameter
e = Λ− v ({1})− v ({2}) . (10)
If e < 0, that is v(.) is strictly subadditive, the maximization in x of joint profits generates less
value than the sum of individual profits as obtained by each firm when it exclusively controls the
lab, a situation where negative externalities dominate. Otherwise v(.) is superadditive, and positive
externalities (weakly) dominate.
 Non-increasing returns to R&D. In this section we assume that
∂2 gˆi
∂s2i
≤ 0, (11)
i = 1, 2. Simple sufficient conditions on the primitives of the model can now be derived that de-
termine the sign of the aggregate measure of externalities, and whether the equilibrium expected
industry profit is fully appropriated by the two firms or partly retained by the lab. These conditions
bear on the sign of indirect and direct R&D externalities, hence on the lab’s expected costs fˆ0 (x) and
firms’ expected gross profits gˆi
(
xi + yi, xj, yj
)
, respectively.
Non-negative R&D externalities — Suppose, as a first case, that indirect and direct R&D exter-
nalities are non-negative. Formally, for i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i,
∂2 fˆ0
∂xi∂xj
≤ 0, (12)
∂gˆi
∂xj
≥ 0, ∂gˆi
∂yj
≥ 0. (13)
Proposition 2 (non-negative R&D externalities) Conditions (12-13) imply that e ≥ 0 (v(.) is superad-
ditive). Then there exists a continuum of firm equilibrium expected payoffs (v∗1 , v
∗
2) ≥ (v1, v2) that verify
v∗1 + v
∗
2 = Λ, (14)
and the lab exactly breaks even in expectation, that is
v∗0 = 0. (15)
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In (12) the non-positive sign of the cross-derivatives of fˆ0 in the dimensions of x describes economies
of scope in the production of R&D inside the external lab. Selecting a higher xi, as demanded by firm
i, makes it less costly for the lab to satisfy firm j.28 This condition is consistent with empirical investi-
gations that evidence the presence of economies of scope mainly in drug discovery (Henderson and
Cockburn, 1996) and only to some extent in clinical trials (Cockburn and Henderson, 2001).29
For an interpretation of the conditions in (13), recall from the structure of each firm’s gross profit
function in (2) that R&D decisions generate not only inter-firm technological spillovers (xj and yj
are arguments of gi, j 6= i) but also a product-market rivalry effect (firm j’s external and internal
R&D impacts firm i’s strategy zi, j 6= i). As the two non-negative derivatives in (13) relate to the
reduced-form gˆi of the gross profit expression, they capture situations where technological spillovers
dominate the negative business stealing effect. This specification points to situations of substantial
spillovers, as observed by Henderson and Cockburn (1996) between pharmaceutical firms. It is also
consistent with Bloom et al. (2013) where significant technological spillovers are found in the case
of pharmaceuticals, together with strategic complementarity in R&D (for a formal illustration see
Example 4 below, case β ≥ 1/2).
Examples of complementarities in pre-clinical research include the use of mRNA (messenger ri-
bonucleic acid) to produce medicines that code for the production of proteins by cells in the body, as
the same biological mechanism can lead in principle to the treatment of many different diseases. The
same applies to research activities in the immuno-oncology domain, as the understanding of how
immune responses are controlled by “checkpoints” can result in drugs against a large set of different
targets.30 In that domain, a molecule approved for the treatment of a given type of cancer can be
extended to other indications – a kind of market expansion effect – with competing pharma compa-
nies learning from each other the indications toward which their respective research efforts can be
targeted.
Non-negative indirect and direct externalities reflect circumstances of weak technological rivalry
among the two firms, both in their contract offers to the lab and in their internal operations, implying
28As Pisano (2006a) puts it, “knowledge and capabilities accumulated in the pursuit of one therapeutic area can often be
leveraged to others” (p. 101).
29“It may be the case ... that success in drug development is purely a function of success in drug discovery”(Cockburn
and Henderson, 2001, p. 1053).
30“The modulation of immune checkpoints using monoclonal antibodies can have a universal effect on immune re-
sponses that is not dependent on tumour histologies or individual cancer-specific antigens” (Hoos, 2016, p. 235).
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a limited ability of the external lab to appropriate R&D benefits. This theoretical characterization is
consistent with the empirical observation that the average profitability of biotech units is persistently
low. Proposition 2 actually establishes that the two firms appropriate all industry profits, and in
expectation the lab exactly breaks even. Therefore:
Corollary 1 When conditions (12-13) hold, incentives to invest upstream, in the external unit, are delinked
from the value generated by R&D, to the exclusive benefit of downstream sponsors.
The following (deterministic) example illustrates Proposition 2 with specific cost and demand
functional forms borrowed from the R&D literature.
Example 1  Each firm i’s inverse demand is pi(q) = S
(
1− 2qiu2i −
σ
ui
qj
uj
)
, i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i, where S is the
number of identical consumers, σ ∈ (0, 2) captures horizontal product differentiation, and ui measures product
quality (e.g., increased drug efficacy), as in Symeonidis (2003). Specifically, let ui = ε (si)
1/4 + εβ
(
sj
)1/4,
where ε > 0 is an inverse cost measure, β ∈ [0, 1] is an inter-firm technological parameter, si = xi + yi and
sj = xj + yj, i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i.31 For simplicity, we set S = σ = ε = 1, β = 1/2, and the production cost
to zero, before solving for the Cournot-Nash quantities (q∗1(x, y), q
∗
2(x, y)). Inserting the latter expressions
in gi
(
si, xj, yj, q
)
= pi(q)qi leads to gˆi
(
si, xj, yj
)
. As ∂
2 gˆi
∂s2i
< 0 (decreasing returns) for all si > 0, from
Proposition 1 we have dy
∗
i
dxi
< 0 (substitutability). Moreover ∂gˆi∂xj > 0 and
∂gˆi
∂yj
> 0 (positive direct externalities)
for all xi, xj > 0, so (13) is satisfied.32 Then any additive cost function for the lab (e.g., fˆ0 (x) = x1 + x2)
satisfies (12), in which case from Proposition 2 the downstream firms appropriate the industry profit. 
Negative R&D externalities — Suppose now that indirect and direct R&D externalities are neg-
ative, that is for i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i,
∂2 fˆ0
∂xi∂xj
> 0, (16)
∂gˆi
∂xj
≤ 0, ∂gˆi
∂yj
≤ 0. (17)
Proposition 3 (negative R&D externalities) Conditions (16-17) imply that e < 0 (v(.) is strictly subad-
ditive). Then there is a unique pair of firm equilibrium expected payoffs (v∗1 , v
∗
2), which are
v∗i = v({i})− |e| ≥ vi, (18)
31If x1 = x2 = 0 we have the same specification as in Symeonidis (2003), where the functional form for ui is adapted
from Motta (1992).
32The expressions of derivatives are omitted for space limitation. They are available from the authors on request.
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i = 1, 2, and the lab appropriates a share of expected industry profits
v∗0 = |e| > 0. (19)
The condition on f0 in (16) formalizes a case of congestion, or diseconomies of scale, in the pro-
duction of R&D by the external lab. Supplying more R&D to a given firm makes it more costly to
serve the other firm. The conditions on gˆi in (17) describe circumstances in which more of firm
j’s R&D, as sourced externally or produced internally, weakly reduces firm i’s reduced-form gross
profit, all other things remaining equal. Together, these formal conditions relate to real-world cir-
cumstances that strongly differ from the ones captured by conditions (12-13). Unlike the empirical
evidence mentioned in the previous section on early-stage discovery activities that involve biotech
entities, diseconomies of scope (Macher and Boerner, 2006) and nonexistent technological spillovers
(Danzon et al. 2005; Macher and Boerner, 2006) have been found in later-stage development activ-
ities, notably in phase 2 and phase 3 clinical trials, which involve CROs. The formal conditions in
(16) and (17) thus point to these development activities.
To illustrate, recent advances in immuno-oncology have induced clinical trials in the hundreds
that test new antibodies or combinations (Tang et al., 2018), implying that the enrollment of patients
by a CRO for several competing sponsors has become problematic. Moreover, regulatory constraints
such as data exclusivity – i.e., a firm that applies for marketing approval cannot refer to the clinical
data generated by a competitor over a given time period – entail limited inter-firm spillovers.
In such cases of negative indirect and direct externalities, the client firms compete for the con-
trol of the lab’s operations in the intermediate R&D market, and are also penalized by the in-house
activity of their competitor. These circumstances are favorable to the lab. Proposition 3 establishes
that negative externalities fully drive the distribution of R&D benefits. Unlike the payoff in the pre-
vious section, the lab here appropriates a positive share of industry profits, in direct proportion to−e
which is positive. Each firm’s payoff is equal to v({i}), i = 1, 2, as would be earned by controlling
the lab exclusively, truncated by |e|. The latter payoff can be shown to be greater that the standalone
value vi.33 The theoretical outcome that the external unit extracts a positive share is consistent with
the observation that CROs involved in clinical trials, unlike biotech units, on average earn superior
average financial returns.
33See Appendix A.4. From (10) the payoff to the lab can be rewritten as firm i’s marginal contribution to industry profit,
that is v∗i = Λ− v({j}), i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i.
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The conditions used in Proposition 3, rewritten in discrete form, apply in the following example.34
Example 2  Assume that x, y ∈ {0, 1}2, so the decision to invest in a cost-reducing program implies a
lump-sum expenditure. The lab’s R&D costs are fˆ0(0, 0) = 0, fˆ0(0, 1) = fˆ0(1, 0) = 1, and fˆ0(1, 1) = +∞,
so that the discrete form of condition (16) is satisfied. Here anti-complementarities imply that the lab serves
at most one firm profitably .35 Firm i’s internal R&D costs are fˆi(yi) = γyi, with γ ≥ 1 capturing a relative
inefficiency vis-a`-vis the lab (cost cutting is a driver of the use of contract service providers). The unit cost of
production is a positive constant ci(xi + yi), with ci(0) = cH and 0 ≤ ci(1) = ci(2) = cL < cH. The two
firms sell a homogeneous good, with total demand q = sup{0, a− p}, with p ≥ 0 and a > cH. Given (x, y),
defining pi = (cH − cL) (a− cH), and solving for Bertrand-Nash prices, leads to gˆi(xi + yi, xj, yj) = pi > 0
if xi + yi ≥ 1 and xj + yj = 0, and gˆi
(
xi + yi, xj, yj
)
= 0 otherwise, so the discrete form of condition (17) is
also satisfied. We assume that internal R&D is worth undertaking, that is γ/pi < 1. To compute equilibrium
payoffs, we consider the following two cases: (1) If the lab is inactive (x1 = x2 = 0), there exists a unique Nash
equilibrium in mixed strategies (α∗i , α
∗
j ) of internal R&D investments, verifying
α∗j × (−γ) +
(
1− α∗j
)
× (pi − γ) = α∗j × 0+
(
1− α∗j
)
× 0,
i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i. By symmetry36
α∗i = α
∗
j = 1−
γ
pi
,
which leads to the payoff vi(α∗1 , α
∗
2) = vi = 0, i = 1, 2.
37 So the firms are willing to transact with the
lab. (2) When the lab is active, from the assumption on fˆ0 only one firm is served (xi = 1 > xj = 0),
and no firm invests in internal R&D since gˆi(1 + 1, 0, yj) − fˆi(1) < gˆi(1 + 0, 0, yj) − fˆi(0), all yj, and
gˆj(0+ 1, 1, yi)− fˆ j(1) < gˆj(0+ 0, 1, yi)− fˆ j(0), all yi. Therefore, industry value is v ({1, 2}) = v ({1}) =
34In the whole paper differentiability is adopted for notational convenience, but is not required as illustrated by Example
2. So the condition in (16) can be rewritten in discrete form as fˆ0(x ∧ x′) + fˆ0(x ∨ x′)− fˆ0(x)− fˆ0(x′) ≥ 0, all x, x′, with
a strict inequality whenever x and x′ cannot be compared with respect to ≥ (strict supermodularity). The conditions in
(17) can also be rewritten as gˆi(xi + yi, xj, yj) ≥ gˆi(xi + yi, x′j, y′j) for all (x′j, y′j) ≥ (xj, yj). In Appendix A.4 the proofs of
Propositions 2 and 3 are written for any fˆ0 which is either weakly submodular or strictly supermodular, respectively.
35The cost specification in this example is borrowed from Laussel and Le Breton (2001). The extreme supermodularity of
fˆ0, with fˆ0(1, 1) = +∞, here helps illustrating the effect of negative externalities on the distribution of industry profits.
36Given that in this example firms are assumed to be symmetric, we leave aside the two asymmetric equilibria in pure
strategies (y∗1 = 0, y∗2 = 1) and (y∗1 = 1, y∗2 = 0).
37In this example, when firm i does not participate in the R&D market, its rival j receives technology from the relatively
more efficient lab (so x∗j = 1), exclusively so (x
∗
i = 0), and finds it profitable not to operate internally (y
∗
j = 0). Then in
this Bertrand context firm i maximizes profits by not investing in internal R&D, and its standalone value is vi = gˆi(0 +
y∗i , 1, 0)− fˆi(y∗i ) = gˆi(0+ 0, 1, 0)− fˆi(0) = 0, i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i.
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v ({2}), so that v∗0 = v ({1, 2}) = pi − 1, and v∗i = v ({1, 2})− v ({j}) = 0, from Proposition 3. Firms’
interests are so antagonistic in this example as to make the lab fully appropriate industry value. 
Uncertainty — The structural conditions in Propositions 2 and 3 also capture circumstances in
which R&D outcomes are uncertain for all parties. To see that, consider again Example 2, but with
the lab and the firms being successful in R&D with probability θ < 1. The unit cost of production
c (xi + yi) is now c (0) = cH with certainty, ci (1) = cL with probability θ and ci (1) = cH with
probability 1 − θ, and ci (2) = cL with probability 1 − (1− θ)2 and ci (2) = cH with probability
(1− θ)2. The distribution of (un)favorable events is assumed to be common knowledge ex ante, and
the true state is discovered only through the realization of R&D tasks (between stages (iii) and (iv) in
the timing described in Section 3) so firms’ payments can be made contingent on it. Condition (16)
remains unchanged, and although the process is now uncertain, condition (17) also remains valid
in expectation, as the choice of firm j to attempt to innovate always reduces firm i’s expected profit.
Thus Proposition 3 still holds. We assume as above that R&D is worth undertaking, even internally,
that is γ/(θpi) < 1. Provided that the probability of success θ remains sufficiently close to 1 so that
1− θ < γ/ (θpi), again a firm will not engage in R&D if its rival receives technology from the lab
or sources it internally, and we can directly generalise the baseline example: (1) If the lab is inactive
(x1 = x2 = 0), there exists a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies
α∗i (θ) = α
∗
j (θ) =
1
θ
(
1− γ
θpi
)
,
for a payoff which again is the same as the standalone value vi (θ) = 0, i = 1, 2, so the firms have an
incentive to transact with the lab. (2) When the lab is active, again from the assumption on fˆ0 only
one firm is served (xi = 1 > xj = 0), and limited uncertainty does not modify the outcome that no
firm invests internally since expected net profits verify gˆi(1+ 1, 0, yj)− fˆi(1) < gˆi(1+ 0, 0, yj)− fˆi(0),
all yj, and gˆj(0 + 1, 1, yi) − fˆ j(1) < gˆj(0 + 0, 1, yi) − fˆ j(0), all yi. The payoff to the firm that does
not receive external R&D is nil, so that v ({1, 2}) = v ({1}) = v ({2}). Then v∗0 = v ({1, 2}), and
v∗i = v ({1, 2})− v ({j}) = 0, i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i, from Proposition 3. With these specifications, the lab’s
expected equilibrium payoff is θpi − 1, the firm that benefits from the lab’s output exactly breaks
even, and its rival earns its standalone value.
In the next example, we show that our results also apply to the polar situation with highly un-
certain R&D. We obtain that, when the competitor or its external contractor might fail with a high
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probability, it can be a dominant strategy for the firms to engage in R&D as well.
Example 3 We consider the specifications of Example 2 with the extension to uncertain R&D as above, and
focus on the case of rare successful outcomes. Internal R&D can be profitable, that is γ/(θpi) < 1, although θ
is sufficiently close to 0 for γ/ (θpi) < (1− θ)2 to hold. In this case, the likelihood that the competitor and the
lab succeed in R&D is so low as to make the probability of simultaneous success negligible. Then everything
happens as if, when deciding to engage or not in R&D, each firm were focusing on its own probability of
success only, abstracting from the other players’ actions. Investing in internal R&D is a dominant strategy:
(1) If the lab is inactive (x1 = x2 = 0), the firms’ expected payoff is (1− θ)θpi − γ, which is slightly higher
than the standalone level vi (θ) = (1− θ)2θpi − γ, i = 1, 2. (2) When the lab is active, again the form of fˆ0
implies that only one firm is served (xi = 1 > xj = 0). Still the distinctive feature here, in comparison to
the previous example, is that both firms choose to invest internally as well: gˆi(1 + 1, 0, yj)− fˆi(1) > gˆi(1 +
0, 0, yj) − fˆi(0), all yj, and gˆj(0 + 1, 1, yi) − fˆ j(1) > gˆj(0 + 0, 1, yi) − fˆ j(0), all yi, for i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i.
Thus v ({i}) = (1− (1− θ)2)(1− θ)pi− γ− 1 (i.e., pi is earned by firm i when the latter player and the lab
do not both fail while firm j fails) and the expected industry value is now v ({1, 2}) = (3− 2θ)(1− θ)θpi −
2γ − 1 (i.e., the sum of firm i’s expected gross payoff (1 − (1 − θ)2)(1 − θ)pi and of firm j’s gross payoff
(1− θ)2θpi net of total R&D costs). Therefore, from Proposition 3 we have v∗0 = (1− θ) θpi − 1 > 0, and
v∗i = v ({1, 2})− v ({j}) = (1− θ)2 θpi − γ, which is positive but only equal to the standalone level (the
profit earned when the competitor controls the lab to its exclusive benefit). By competing for the lab’s resources,
here the firms earn less than if the lab does not exist. 
There is more in Examples 2 and 3 than an illustration of the applicability of a theoretical propo-
sition to specific algebraic forms. Only in the latter example, where the probability of success of R&D
operations is assumed to be low, both the lab and its sponsor engage in R&D efforts. This outcome
is consistent with the empirical evidence (Guedj, 2005) that projects with a low probability of success
are more often conducted through a contractual alliance between a large firm and a smaller biotech
company (as in Example 3) than conducted entirely within the same entity (as in Example 2). The
comparison of Examples 2 and 3 thus rationalizes the general observation that the reduction in drug
R&D productivity over the last decades – which is formally captured here by a lower probability of
success – has coincided with increasingly frequent situations where large pharma firms and smaller
external biotech units contribute jointly to research and development (Pisano, 2006a; Rydzewski,
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2008; Scannell et al., 2012). This is a sufficiently high level of uncertainty, in our theoretical frame-
work, that triggers an investment by all industry participants.
Another interesting equilibrium property illustrated by examples 2 and 3 is that the firms (princi-
pals), whose payments to the lab (agent) are truthful, are shielded from the uncertainty that is specific
to external R&D operations. The lab, however, bears the risk inherent to its technological activities.
These findings, beyond specific examples, can be generalized to all situations described in Proposi-
tions 2 and 3, for any distribution of θ, by establishing that each firm can adjust within boundaries
its contract offer to the lab, without changing the equilibrium strategies and the related equilibrium
expected payoffs to all parties, in order to guarantee for itself a constant payoff whenever possible.
This adjusted transfer function, toi , is characterized by the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Suppose that (t˜, x˜, y˜, z˜) is a TSPNE. Define, for each θ, the lower bound of firm i’s gross payoff
over all possible efficient choices38
g (θ) = inf
x∈X∗
[g˜i (x, θ)] ,
and the function h : Θ→ R, whose value depends on the realized state only, with
Eθ [h (θ)] = 0, (20)
vi (x˜, y˜, z˜, θ)− g (θ) ≤h (θ) ≤ vi (x˜, y˜, z˜, θ) , (21)
all θ ∈ Θ. Then toi (x, θ) = sup {0, g˜i (x, θ)− [vi (x˜, y˜, z˜, θ)− h(θ)]} is a truthful best reply to tj that
incentivizes the lab to choose an action which is undistinguishable from x˜, in that it yields the same expected
payoffs to all parties. However, for any realized θ the (ex-post) equilibrium payoffs are:
v0 (x˜, θ) + h(θ), vi (x˜, y˜, z˜, θ)− h(θ), vj (x˜, y˜, z˜, θ) ,
i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i.
The condition in (20) is needed for all profit expressions to remain unchanged in expectation,
although the lab receives more than the expected level for some values of θ, and less for others. In
(21) the first inequality implies that contract offers to the lab are non-negative, and the second one
that the equilibrium payoff to the firm is also non-negative in all states of nature.39
38Unless there exists a multiplicity of optima, g (θ) does not differ from the equilibrium gross payoff g˜i (x˜, θ).
39The adjusted contract offer introduced in Lemma 1 remains compatible with an upfront part toi paid to the agent.
Supposing that toi (x˜, θ) > 0 for almost all θ, the upfront payment is bounded from above by the non-negative threshold
Ti = maxT>0 {T|g˜i (x˜, θ)− vi (x˜, y˜, z˜, θ) ≥ T, for almost all θ}. Indeed, as long as toi ≤ Ti, equilibrium contingent pay-
ments koi (x˜, θ) = t
o
i (x˜, θ)− toi verify koi (x˜, θ) ≥ g˜i (x˜, θ)− vi (x˜, y˜, z˜, θ)− Ti ≥ 0, for almost all θ.
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By introducing in their payment strategy an adjustment term h(θ), as defined in Lemma 1, a firm
can condition its financial transfers on the realization of the technological risk, and thereby protect
its ex-post payoff from adverse events. In unfavourable circumstances where uncertainties imply that
the gross equilibrium profit can be so low as to be strictly lower than v∗i with positive probability, then
each firm can adjust its payment to earn the lower bound g (θ) ≤ v∗i if an adverse event occurs (e.g.,
the lab’s efforts are unsuccessful, or they cost much more than expected), or a superior profit level
v ≥ v∗i that does not depend on θ otherwise. In more favourable circumstances where uncertainty
does not prevent the gross equilibrium profit to be higher than the expected net equilibrium value v∗i
for almost all θ, each firm can guarantee for itself the latter value as an ex-post payoff, which is thus
independent of the realized state of nature.
Toward a more formal characterization of adjusted payment strategies, that is risk-proof contract
offers, we define the set Θ (v) such that g (θ) ≤ v, with v ≥ v∗i . Then:
Proposition 4 Suppose that (t˜, x˜, y˜, z˜) is a TSPNE: (i) If g (θ) ≤ Eθ [g˜i (x˜, θ)− t˜i (x˜, θ)] for a subset of Θ
with positive measure, firm i can guarantee for itself an ex-post profit equal to the gross equilibrium value g (θ)
for all θ ∈ Θ (v), and to the higher constant40 v for all θ ∈ Θ\Θ (v), by addressing to the lab the risk-proof
contract offer
toi (x, θ) =
 0 if θ ∈ Θ (v) ,sup {0, g˜i (x, θ)− v} if θ ∈ Θ\Θ (v) .
(ii) Otherwise, firm i can guarantee for itself the expected net equilibrium value v∗i as an ex-post profit for
almost all states of nature, by addressing to the lab the risk-proof contract offer
toi (x, θ) = sup {0, g˜i (x, θ)− v∗i } .
This proposition establishes that truthful contract offers are available to the firms that shield them
(at least partly) from adverse technological events by transferring (some or all of ) the burden of risk
to the upstream lab. This insurance property holds in particular when R&D externalities are non-
negative (e ≥ 0), implying from Proposition 2 that the equilibrium payoff to the lab, in expectation,
is exactly zero. In that case, valuable projects at the industry level are vulnerable since an unfavor-
able draw necessarily yields, ex-post, a negative net return to the external lab. This vulnerability is
made more acute when risk-proof strategies are used that pass on the downside effect of uncertainty
40This constant v can be easily characterized.
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through risk-proof contingent payments. (Of course such a negative outcome can generalize to situ-
ations where profits are positive, as in Proposition 3, and still sufficiently close to zero.) As a direct
implication, risk-averse investors are deterred to finance projects on the supply side of the intermedi-
ate market for technology, and “fewer projects being funded means a weaker industry pipeline, and
fewer new drugs”(Cockburn and Lerner, 2009, p. 5).
Some safeguarding measures can be designed that aim at avoiding the abandonment of projects
that contribute positively to the total industry profit, but are characterized by a high degree of tech-
nological uncertainty. Such measures, in light of our results and their connections to the empirical
evidence, appear less relevant for clinical development than for early-stage research characterized
by significant economies of scope and technological spillovers. The financial back-up of a partner
university, as commonly observed for startups since the emergence of biotech engineering, can be
interpreted as a relevant attempt to insure promising spin-offs from unfavorable events. Our formal
analysis also points to the introduction of regulatory constraints on the adjustment of payments, by
big pharma companies, on the realization of technological risks.
We now consider cases with increasing returns to R&D.
 Non-decreasing returns to R&D. In this section, for i = 1, 2, we assume that
∂2 gˆi
∂s2i
≥ 0, (22)
where si = xi + yi. We identify simple conditions for Propositions 2 and 3 to remain valid.
Proposition 5 Suppose that returns to R&D are non-decreasing, as in (22). Then Propositions 2 and 3 still
hold if ∂
2 gˆj
∂xj∂xi
≥ 0, i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i. Otherwise a sufficient condition is dy
∗
j
dxi
> −1.
The interplay of contracted-out and internal R&D levels is central to our results.
From Proposition 1, we know that increasing R&D returns imply that
dy∗j
dxj
≥ 0, which is sufficient
to obtain that dg˜idxj has the same sign as
∂gˆi
∂xj
and ∂gˆi∂yj (see Lemma A.1 in Appendix A.3). As for the sign
of dg˜idxi , it depends also on
dy∗j
dxi
. There are two cases. If xj and xi are complementary inside firm i’s gross
payoff function, so that ∂
2 gˆj
∂xj∂xi
≥ 0, then y∗j is monotone increasing in xi, that is
dy∗j
dxi
≥ 0. It follows
that dg˜idxi has the same sign as
∂gˆi
∂xj
and ∂gˆi∂yj (see Lemma A.2), and Propositions 2 and 3 remain valid with
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non-decreasing returns as well. When xi and xj are substitutable, in that
∂2 gˆj
∂xj∂xi
< 0, then y∗j decreases
in xi, that is
dy∗j
dxi
< 0. Here more R&D purchased from the lab reduces the other firm’s internal R&D
level. In the most extreme circumstances, the latter effect could possibly result in dg˜idxi being negative
when ∂gˆi∂xj and
∂gˆi
∂yj
are both positive. The latter property however does not occur when the substitution
effect is limited, more specifically when
dy∗j
dxi
> −1.
The next example illustrates all cases predicted by Proposition 5. It shows that while external
and internal R&D tasks are complementary (a consequence of non-decreasing returns to R&D from
Proposition 1), the client firms fully appropriate industry profit (as in Proposition 2) or concede to
the lab a positive share of it (as in Proposition 3).
Example 4  The cost of the external lab is fˆ0(x) = γ(x21 + x22)/2− δx1x2, with δ ∈ [−γ,γ), γ > 0, and
the internal R&D and production costs are fˆi(yi) = κ + y2i , i = 1, 2 (with κ > 0) and c > 0, respectively.
Final-market inverse demands are pi(q) = sup
{
0, ai(x, y)− qi − qj
}
, i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i, where pi is the price,
(qi, qj) are quantities, and the price intercept ai(x, y) = (a + si + βsj) involves spillovers measured by the
parameter β ∈ [0, 1] as in d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988). Here si = xi + yi can be interpreted as the sum
of R (xi) and D (yi) as in Vonortas (1994), toward a quality improvement (e.g., increased drug safety). Non-
cooperative profit maximization in quantities leads to q∗i (x, y) =
[
(a− c) + si (2− β) + sj (2β− 1)
]
/3. We
have ∂2 gˆi/∂s2i = 2 (2− β)2 /9 > 0, so condition (22) is satisfied for all parameter values (increasing R&D
returns). Then, whether Proposition 2 or 3 applies depends on δ and β: (i) if δ ≥ 0 (< 0) then condition (12)
(resp. condition (16)) holds; (ii) if β ≥ 1/2 (< 1/2) then condition (13) (resp. condition (17)) holds, directly
from ∂gˆi/∂xj = ∂gˆi/∂yj = (2/3) (2β− 1) q∗i (x, y). Moreover, ∂2 gˆi/∂xj∂xi = (2/9) (2− β) (2β− 1) ≥ 0
only if β ≥ 1/2, and we have dy∗j /dxi = 3 (2β− 1) (β− 2) /
[(
β2 − β+ 7) (β2 − 3β− 1)] > −1 for
β < 1/2. Therefore, in this example the non-negative R&D externalities case of Proposition 2 applies if
β ≥ 1/2 and δ ≥ 0, and the negative externalities case of Proposition 3 applies if β < 1/2 and δ < 0. 
An important lesson of Propositions 2 and 3 is that the interplay of indirect (through the lab)
and direct (inter-firm) technological externalities drives the additivity status of the value function v
in (9), which in the end determines the distibution of industry profits. This characterization applies
in all situations where the two types of externalities have the same sign, as formalized by the easy-
to-use conditions (12-13) and (16-17). It applies also in “mixed” cases where indirect externalities
are negative, while direct externalities are not, or vice versa. For an illustration, consider again the
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previous example by setting δ = β = 0, and also by assuming that the firms rely exclusivey on the
exernal lab (y1 = y2 = 0), so that their gross reduced-form profit expressions are similar to the ones in
Ho (2009). Here we have non-negative indirect but negative direct externalities (∂2 fˆ0/∂x1∂x2 = 0 and
∂gˆi/∂xj < 0 for all positive final-market quantities). Simple computations lead to v({1}) = v({2}) =
(a− c)2 /5, and Λ = (a− c)2 /4, a case of strict subadditivity, implying from (18) that equilibrium
payoffs are v∗1 = v
∗
2 = v
∗
0/3 = (a− c)2 /20.
5 Incentives for More Integration
The distribution of industry profits can be modified by a shift to a more integrated structure that uni-
fies the lab with one of the two firms, or both. The analysis of incentives to integrate vertically, after
having characterized the equilibrium profit distribution in the decentralized common agency setting,
is consistent with industry practice as the acquisition of an R&D unit by a big pharma company often
follows a period of collaboration (Folta, 1998; Danzon and Grabowski, 2012).
Supposing that the owners of the lab and the two firms can participate in the equity market in
order to depart from the initial outsourcing equilibrium characterized in the previous section, we as-
sume that (i) initially, each entity is owned by distinct sets of individuals (no one can simultaneously
be a seller and a buyer); (ii) when the lab and only one firm integrate vertically, the unified entity can
agree to supply R&D to the other firm by bargaining with it over the sharing of industry profits; and
(iii) transaction costs are nil.
Consider first the situation in which the lab and the two firms all participate in some form of
integration on the intermediate R&D market. This occurs if the lab acquires the two firms and controls
them as subsidiaries, or if the two firms share the ownership of the lab and control it as a joint
venture, with choices of internal R&D and final-market strategies remaining non cooperative (no
collusion). In these two cases there is no gain in joint profits to be earned vis-a`-vis equilibrium payoffs
of the common agency structure. This is because the truthfulness of the firms’ equilibrium payment
strategies implies that the lab is offered two transfer schedules which exactly reflect the respective
shapes of the firms’ gross profit functions (that is, g˜i (x, θ), i = 1, 2). The lab thereby internalizes both
direct and indirect externalities, and thus is incentivized to supply R&D outputs that maximize the
joint profits of all participants. It follows that the net share of joint profits accruing to each buyer of
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another firm’s equity cannot improve on the amount of net profits received in the common agency
equilibrium. Forward integration (i.e., the two users become subsidiaries of the lab) would imply
the payment of v∗i by the lab to the firms’ owners. Backward integration (i.e., the lab becomes a joint
venture) would require the total payment of v∗0 by the two firms for the ownership of the upstream
assets. The equality v∗0 + v∗1 + v
∗
2 = Λ holds in all cases, so there is no incentive for the lab and the
two firms to form a unique entity, unless further assumptions are introduced (e.g., cost or demand
parameters become a function of the governance structure). More formally:
Proposition 6 In the initial outsourcing equilibrium, the firms’ non-cooperative transfers and the lab’s for-
profit R&D operations result in a maximum expected industry profit: x˜ ∈ arg maxx∈X Eθ [g˜1 (x) + g˜2 (x)
− f0(x)]. Therefore, unless the firms coordinate internal R&D operations (y) or collude in final-market com-
mercial decisions (z), there is no incentive for the lab to acquire the two firms and control them as subsidiaries,
nor for the firms to share the ownership of the lab and control it as a joint venture.
As for uncertainty, it can only reduce incentives for the two firms to acquire and control the lab
jointly, since by doing so they internalize the part of risks that can be transferred via adjusted pay-
ments to the supply side of the R&D market. The viewpoint of the lab’s owners is different though,
as by acquiring the two firms they alleviate the burden of risk they bear in the initial outsourcing situ-
ation. Nevertheless, Proposition 6 establishes that the integrated structure cannot generate the value
that is needed to finance such possible risk dilution benefits. The integration of all market partici-
pants can be financed only if the firms neutralize downstream strategic interactions by coordinating
internal R&D activities or/and final-market strategies.
It remains to investigate all alternative forms of integration that can allow the owners of the lab,
or of the two firms, to privately appropriate a larger share of the industry maximum Λ than in the
decentralized outsourcing initial situation. Toward an equilibrium industry structure in the equity
market, we consider the following discrete set of possible arrangements: the horizontal integration
of firms 1 and 2 for the joint procurement of external R&D (internal R&D and final-market choices
remaining non cooperative), the vertical integration of the lab with firm 1, or with firm 2. We consider
in turn the situations in which the value function v (in (9)) is superadditive (e ≥ 0, as in Proposition 2),
then strictly subadditive (e < 0, as in Proposition 3), depending on the interplay of indirect (through
the lab) and direct (inter-firm) technological externalities. The two cases are illustrated respectively
by Figures 1 and 2, which represent the space of possible partitions of the maximum industry profit
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Λ as a 2-simplex, with full appropriation by the lab (i.e., v0 = Λ) at the top vertex, and by either of
the two firms at the bottom vertices. More generally, the payoffs to the lab and each of the two firms
are proportional to the distance of the allocation point to the edge opposite to their respective vertex.
Non-negative R&D externalities — When indirect and direct R&D externalities are both non-
negative, or in “mixed” situations with positive and negative externalities where the former domi-
nate, so that v is superadditive (e ≥ 0), from Proposition 2 the lab only breaks even in equilibrium
of the common agency structure, that is its expected profit is v∗0 = 0, and the two firms thus expect
to appropriate the total industry profit, v∗1 + v
∗
2 = Λ (where v
∗
i ≥ vi, k = 1, 2). As there exists a
continuum of firm equilibrium expected payoffs, the exact distribution (v∗1 , v
∗
2) can only reflect cir-
cumstances outside of the initial model specifications. Hereafter we formalize such circumstances by
the bargaining powers (φ1, φ2) in [0, 1]2, with φ1 + φ2 = 1. They verify
v∗k = vk + φk (Λ− v) , (23)
where k = 1, 2, and (v1, v2) is the disagreement point, with v = v1 + v2, so that,
φk =
v∗k − vk
Λ− v . (24)
Although with non-negative externalities joint R&D procurement cannot increase the firms’ joint
profit, a larger individual share can be earned by a firm if it deviates unilaterally from the outsourcing
equilibrium to acquire the lab. By exclusively controlling the lab, the vertically integrated entity {0, i}
benefits from a stronger bargaining position. In case of disagreement its payoff becomes v ({i}) ≥ vi,
while its rival j’s payoff remains at vj, the standalone value. The bargaining process, in case of vertical
integration, thus determines an expected payoff to the unified entity equal to
v{0,i}0+i = v ({i}) + φi
(
Λ− v ({i})− vj
)
> v∗i , (25)
and an expected payoff to the outsider equal to
v{0,i}j = vj + φj
(
Λ− v ({i})− vj
)
< v∗j , (26)
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with the weights
(
φi, φj
)
as defined in (24), i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i.41
As they face two competing alternatives, the lab’s owners can choose the firm to integrate with.42
By selling out to firm i, they may expect to earn v{0,i}0 = v
{0,i}
0+i − v{0,i}i , the difference between the
expected payoff to the unified entity and the acquirers’ residual claim. The two firms’ respective
owners thus compete in the equity market, and their willingness to pay is the difference between the
profit they earn by acquiring the lab and the profit they earn should the lab integrate with the other
firm. In comparison to the initial equilibrium situation, the firm that does not integrate, say firm j, is
forced to concede what the other firm appropriates by acquiring the lab. Firm i’s willingness to pay,
as an acquirer, is thus the sum of what it appropriates, and what the other would have appropriated,
that is
v{0,i}0+i − v{0,j}i = φj (v ({i})− vi) + φi
(
v ({j})− vj
)
> 0, (27)
i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i.43 Therefore, although firms are asymmetric, and appropriate different amounts by
acquiring the lab, the willingness to pay is the same across the two firms. Competition in the equity
market is thus frontal, and it leads to the integration of the lab with any of the two firms, indifferently.
— Figure 1 about here —
In the equilibrium industry structure, firm i’s owners have bidden their willingness to pay so
they receive only v{0,j}i < v
∗
i , a case of winner’s curse. Uncertainty does not help, as by integrating
the lab the acquirer cannot benefit any more from the contractual ability to shield (at least partly) its
financial performance from adverse technological events.44 The rival j’s owners are not better off, as
by contracting out for R&D with the integrated entity {0, i} they earn only v{0,i}j < v∗j . As for the lab’s
41An equality sign replaces the strict inequality signs in (25) and (26) only if the exclusive control of the lab by firm i
entails no benefit vis-a`-vis the standalone value, that is v ({i}) = vi.
42For completeness, if the exclusive control of the lab strictly dominates the standalone option only for firm i, so that
v ({i}) > vi and v ({j}) = vj, then v{0,j}0+j = v∗j . As there is no incentive for the latter firm j to integrate vertically, in that
case firm i acquires the lab (it pays ε > v∗0 = v
{1,2}
0 = 0 with ε arbitrarily small), and the equilibrium structure is {0, i}, with
payoffs as in (25-26). If v ({i}) = vi as well, then no firm is interested in acquiring the lab.
43In (27) we have v{0,i}0+i − v
{0,j}
i = 0 only if v ({i})− vi = v ({j})− vj = 0, or φi = v ({j})− vj = 0, i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i.
44However, integration is more attractive if it entails a reduced ability for firm j, as an outsider, to transfer risks to the
lab when the latter is controlled by its rival i. Still, by integrating the lab the acquirer must bear the consequence of risks
that were transferred upstream in the initial outsourcing situation. So even when vertical integration modifies the design
of contracts and a redistribution of risks over R&D market participants, at this level of generality it is not clear whether the
net effect of that change mitigates the winner’s curse problem or not.
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owners, they earn a payoff equal to the common maximum bid, which from (24) and (27) is equal to
v{0,1}0 = v
{0,2}
0 =
v ({1})− v1
Λ− v (v
∗
2 − v2) +
v ({2})− v2
Λ− v (v
∗
1 − v1) > v∗0 = 0, (28)
with the strict inequality replaced by an equality sign only in the degenerate case where v ({i}) = vi
for the two firms (i = 1, 2). Otherwise, even if v∗i = vi for one of the two firms (say i = 1), the
inequality remains strict (as necessarily v∗2 − v2 = Λ− v− (v∗1 − v1) > 0).45
Therefore, in expectation, the lab’s owners extract a positive share of industry profits in the equity
market (point V in Figure 1), unlike in the initial equilibrium of the R&D market (Proposition 2).
This theoretical result is consistent with the empirical evidence in Higgins and Rodriguez (2006),
where firms overbid for an external unit, and the acquirer succumbs to the winner’s curse. More
recently, Pisano (2015) also reflected on whether “pharmaceutical companies [are] paying more for
R&D by acquiring companies than by carrying out the R&D themselves”. According to our result,
pharmaceutical companies pay more for R&D by acquiring the lab than by engaging in a contractual
arrangement with it. This is because, in this model, competition is tougher in the equity market,
where only one firm can acquire the lab, and the opportunity cost of not being that firm is very
high, whereas in the R&D market firms can partially reconcile their antagonism through finely tuned
contract offers.
Proposition 7 With non-negative R&D externalities (e ≥ 0), one of the two firms – which are possibly asym-
metric – acquires the lab with equal probability 1/2. The bidding contest in the equity market implies a strictly
higher expected profit to the lab, and a lower one to each firm, than in the initial outsourcing equilibrium.
The latter proposition points to exit payoffs to capital holders as a long-term financial incentive
that can motivate investments in early-stage research activities (discovery). Indeed, from (28) the
expected profit to the lab’s owners in the equity market can be as high as the net industry levelΛ− v,
which occurs when v ({i}) is set equal to Λ− vj, i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i. This case describes rather extreme
situations where, in the initial outsourcing equilibrium, the net marginal contribution of each firm
to the total industry value is equal to zero, that is v({1, 2})− v({i})− vj = 0, for i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i,
implying that having two firms instead of only one does not change the industry value.
45Otherwise, even if v∗i = vi for one of the two firms (say i = 1), the inequality in (28) remains strict (as necessarily
v∗2 − v2 = Λ− v−
(
v∗1 − v1
)
> 0).
33
On the other hand, exit payoffs can also be very low. Again from (28), the gain to the lab’s owners
in the equity market are negligible whenever the difference v ({i})− vi, for i = 1, 2, approaches zero.
This situation relates typically to interesting situations where the lab’s superior efficiency originates
from economies of scope that can hardly be exploited when a firm controls the external unit exclu-
sively for itself.46 In that case, the lab’s owners, who exactly break-even in the initial outsourcing
equilibrium (Proposition 2), cannot reapproriate industry profits by selling the equity to a firm. They
thus have little incentive to invest in the first place, even when large economies of scope imply a
project of high total value Λ.
Negative R&D externalities — When indirect and direct R&D externalities are both negative,
or in “mixed” situations with positive and negative externalities where the latter dominate, so that
v is strictly subadditive (e < 0), from Proposition 3 the equilibrium expected payoffs in the initial
outsourcing situation are v∗0 = |e| > 0, and v∗i = v({i})− |e| ≥ vi, i = 1, 2, so that v∗1 + v∗2 < Λ. As
an alternative to the initial outsourcing situation, the firms can opt for an horizontal arrangement in
order to procure jointly external R&D. In that case they behave cooperatively as a unique principal
on the intermediate market for technology, and fully appropriate the maximum industry profit, with
the lab breaking even exactly in expectation (point H in Figure 2 below).47 We thus have v{1,2}0 = 0
and v{1,2}1 + v
{1,2}
2 = Λ (here the superscript {1, 2} refers to the industry structure with firms 1 and 2
procuring jointly).
The initial outsourcing equilibrium payoffs determine the firms’ disagreement point (v∗1 , v
∗
2)when
they bargain over the agent’s expected payoff v∗0 = Λ− v∗1− v∗2 . The firms’ expected payoffs
(
v{1,2}1 , v
{1,2}
2
)
then verify
v{1,2}k = v
∗
k +ωk (Λ− v∗1 − v∗2) , (29)
where k = 1, 2, implying that bargaining powers (ω1,ω2) in [0, 1]2, with ω1 +ω2 = 1, are
ωk =
v{1,2}k − v∗k
Λ− v∗1 − v∗2
. (30)
46To illustrate, consider Example 4 above (see Section 4), with β = 1/2 (so direct externalities are nil, for simplicity), and
δ > 0 (economies of scope), so e > 0. Then, whenever the cost parameter γ takes a sufficiently high value, supposing that
firm i controls the lab for itself it must focus on internal R&D (the yi dimension) to earn a maximum profit v ({i}) whic is
only slightly higher than the standalone value vi.
47A horizontal arrangement here relates to the intermediate market for technology, as opposed to the final market for
products, where the firms are assumed to remain competitors. This situation is similar to the cases observed by Majewski
(2004) where firms engaged in a technology alliance jointly choose to outsource their R&D to a third party in order to split
costs.
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From Proposition 3 we know that v∗0 = Λ− v∗1 − v∗2 > 0, implying that in (29) we have v{1,2}k ≥ v∗k
for k = 1, 2, with a strict inequality sign for at least one firm, implying that the latter firm earns a
positive gain by shifting to the horizontal arrangement. Moreover, the definition of e in (10) together
with v∗i = v({i})− |e| in (18) imply that v∗j = Λ− v ({i}), so that v{1,2}j ≥ v∗j and v{1,2}j = Λ− v{1,2}i
lead to v{1,2}i ≤ v ({i}), i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i, again with a strict inequality sign for at least one firm. It
follows that
v({k})− |e| ≤ v{1,2}k ≤ v ({k}) , (31)
where k = 1, 2, with at least one strict inequality sign. In (31) the first inequality states that any
situation resulting in lower individual payoffs than in the initial equilibrium is rejected. The second
inequality indicates that each firm’s expected payoff in the horizontal arrangement is bounded from
above by v ({i}), the value generated when it acquires the external lab without contracting with its
rival.
While the two firms’ joint profit is maximized in the horizontal arrangement, each firm has an
incentive to depart unilaterally from {1, 2} by acquiring the lab, for a strictly48 higher disagreement
payoff v ({i}) > v∗i accruing to the integrated entity {0, i}, and a (weakly) lower disagreement payoff
vj ≤ v∗j to the other firm. By controlling the lab and benefitting exclusively from its technology, in
case of disagreement the integrated entity can guarantee for itself the upper bound of the horizon-
tal arrangement payoff in (31), while the outsider earns only its standalone value. The bargaining
process, with vertical integration, implies an expected payoff to the unified entity equal to
v{0,i}0+i = v ({i}) +ωi
(
Λ− v ({i})− vj
)
> v{1,2}i , (32)
and an expected payoff to the outsider equal to
v{0,i}j = vj +ωj
(
Λ− v ({i})− vj
)
< v{1,2}j , (33)
i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i.49
48In this negative externalities situation (e = Λ− v ({i})− v ({j}) < 0) we have v ({i}) > Λ− v ({j}) = v∗i .
49The strict inequality sign in (33) is a consequence of v ({i}) > v∗i ≥ vi, and possibly of firm j’s strictly lower disagree-
ment value vj < v∗j (this differs from the non-negative externalities case in (26)). Then the strict inequality in (32) follows
from v{1,2}i + v
{1,2}
j = v
{0,i}
0+i + v
{0,i}
j = Λ, which leads to v
{0,i}
0+i − v
{1,2}
i = v
{1,2}
j − v
{0,i}
j > 0.
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— Figure 2 about here —
The lab’s owners, as in the non-negative externalities situation of the previous section, can thus
make the two firms compete in the equity market by soliciting bids in order to appropriate a share of
industry profits. Provided that no restriction is introduced that limits payment offers, again the firms
have the same willingness to pay for the lab, that is
v{0,i}0+i − v{0,j}i = ωj (v ({i})− vi) +ωi
(
v ({j})− vj
)
> 0, (34)
i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i, and any of them becomes the acquirer with the same probability 1/2. The payoffs
structure already obtained in the non-negative externalities case thus prevails, with each firm’s re-
spective owners earning exactly their outside value, v{0,2}1 < v
{1,2}
1 and v
{0,1}
2 < v
{1,2}
2 , in any of the
two possible equilibrium industry structures.
However, with negative externalities it is not a priori established that the lab’s owners are better
off post integration than in the initial outsourcing equilibrium. Inserting the expression of the firms’
respective bargaining powers in (34), and reorganizing terms (see Appendix A.9), we find that
v{0,1}0 = v
{0,2}
0 =
v ({1})− v1
|e|
(
v{1,2}2 − v∗2
)
+
v ({2})− v2
|e|
(
v{1,2}1 − v∗1
)
≥ v∗0 = |e| . (35)
The value that can be extracted by the lab’s owners by selling their property rights to any of the
two – possibly asymmetric – firms (from I to V in Figure 2) is only weakly greater than the share of
expected industry profits obtained in Proposition 3. To summarize:
Proposition 8 With negative R&D externalities (e < 0): (a) If the firms can commit not to integrate the
lab they horizontally coordinate external technology sourcing and appropriate the total industry value Λ; (b)
Otherwise, one of the two firms acquires the lab with the same probability 1/2, and the positive profit earned
by the lab’s owners in the equity market is only weakly superior than in the initial outsourcing equilibrium.
Part (a) of Proposition 8 focuses on cases where the firms, for some exogenous reasons (e.g., a
regulation, or a strategic orientation), rule out the possibility to acquire the lab. When technological
externalities are negative (e < 0), because multi-client R&D operations entail diseconomies of scope
and inter-firm knowledge spillovers are limited, or as a consequence of a strong business-stealing
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effect in the final market, the firms are more likely to coordinate horizontally the sourcing of new
technology from the same external lab than in the case of positive externalities. This observation is
reminicent of Majewski (2004), where evidence is found that “when collaborative agreements involve
firms that compete in downstream markets, they tend to outsource their collaborative R&D to a third
party” (p. 2). Part (b) of Proposition 8 emphasizes that, with negative technological externalities
(late-stage clinical development), the financial performance of the lab can only be weakly augmented
in the equity market in comparison to the initial outsourcing equilibrium. As the upstream expected
financial returns are already positive in the latter equilibrium, and monotone increasing with the
magnitude of e (in Proposition 3), the lab’s owners face relatively weak incentives to sell ownership
to a downstream firm when their activities are characterized by strongly negative externalities.
Financial constraints — Propositions 7 and 8 are derived under the assumption that bids are un-
restricted. However, in real-world business circumstances a financial constraint might be introduced
that limits firms’ ability to compete for the control of an external entity. In the theoretical context of
the model, the effect of such a constraint can be investigated by assuming that the price paid to the
lab’s owners, in case of vertical integration, cannot be so high as to imply a lower expected payoff
to the acquiring firm than in the initial outsourcing equilibrium. Formally, the two firms’ respective
financial constraints are thus
v∗i ≤ v{0,i}i = Λ− v{0,i}j − v{0,i}0 , (36)
i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i. In principle such constraints make it more difficult for a firm to acquire the lab
when the latter makes positive profits than when it exactly breaks even. They also help identifying
the profile of the most agressive bidder.
With non-negative R&D externalities (e ≥ 0), as Λ − v∗i = v∗j from Proposition 2, firm i’s con-
straint in (36) becomes v{0,i}0 ≤ v∗j − v{0,i}j . In other words, firm i’s maximum bid, when it acquires
the lab, must not exceed what firm j has lost, as an outsider, because of the change in bargaining
positions vis-a`-vis the outsourcing situation. By using (23) and (26), firm i’s financial constraint can
thus be rewritten v{0,i}0 ≤ φj (v ({i})− vi), i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i. The lab’s owners face two competing bids,
and select the highest, say the one of firm i if φj (v ({i})− vi) ≥ φi
(
v ({j})− vj
)
which, by using
(24), is equivalent to
v∗i − vi
v ({i})− vi
≤
v∗j − vj
v ({j})− vj
. (37)
The comparison in (37) predicts that the acquirer is the ”weaker“ firm, that is the one whose net
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equilibrium expected payoff in the initial outsourcing situation (that is v∗i − vi), relatively to the net
profit that the integrated entity can guarantee for itself (v ({i})− vi), is lower.
With negative R&D externalities (e < 0), the same reasoning starting from (36) leads to the fol-
lowing condition for firm i to be the one that acquires the lab:
v{1,2}i − vi
v({i})− |e| − vi
≤
v{1,2}j − vj
v({j})− |e| − vj
. (38)
Here the acquirer is the firm whose gain in the horizontal arrangement (that is v{1,2}i − vi), relatively
to the initial equilibrium net expected payoff (v∗i − vi = v({i})− |e| − vi), is lower.
The theoretical prediction of conditions (37 - 38) is compatible with the empirical evidence. In
Higgins and Rodriguez (2006), the firms experiencing a deterioration of their research pipeline are
found to be more likely to engage in the acquisition of a biotech entity. In Danzon et al. (2007), the
financially strong firms appear to be less likely to engage in acquisitions. In other words, the most
active firms in the equity market are not the ones with the highest profit prospects nor the deepest
pockets.
6 Conclusion
Our formal analysis offers a new rationale for the low average profitability of the science-based busi-
nesses of biotech (Pisano, 2006a, 2010), and the high amount of risk they take in comparison to their
pharma sponsors (Golec and Vernon, 2009; Thakor et al., 2017), as observed since the emergence of
genetic engineering in the 1970s. In light of our results, and their connection with empirical observa-
tions, we believe that limited financial returns should not be seen as evidence of disappointing tech-
nological progress, but can be interpreted as a confirmation that economies of scope and inter-firm
knowledge spillovers have been significant in the biotechnology domain. Indeed, in such circum-
stances, our results establish that the decision by competing firms to outsource early-stage research
activities to a common external unit leads most expected value, possibly very substantial, to be ap-
propriated by downstream sponsors. This conclusion does not extend, in our theoretical framework,
to contracted-out development services that are characterized by negative technological externalities.
Moreover, the higher level of idiosyncratic risk (specific to an individual unit or project) in biotech
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firms than in pharma companies is explained in our model by the ability of downstream firms to
transfer – at least partly – the financial consequences of R&D uncertainties to the supply side of the
market for technology by the means of contingent transfer payments.
R&D outsourcing is attractive from the viewpoint of big pharma companies, because it allows
them to transfer risks to an external unit whose distinctive capabilites, and the ability to internalize
indirect (through the lab) and direct (inter-firm) technological externalities, are sources of efficiency
gains. However, the delinkage of upstream investment incentives from total industry value, and
the vulnerability of investors’ net returns to negative shocks, together theorize the abandonment of
projects precisely in those early-stage areas that can generate critical advances toward new treatments
or preventives. An important consequence is that, although the long-run perspective of substantial
exit payoffs in the equity market can in some cases generate incentives to start a biotech unit, research
outsourcing does not always qualify as a relevant pathway to address the declining productivity in
innovation issue that has characterized the industry over several decades. Our theoretical results thus
do not support the view of that externalization strategy as the panacea often described by business
experts or industry publications.
7 References
Allain, M-L., Henry, E. and Kyle, M.K., 2015, “Competition and the efficiency of markets for technol-
ogy,” Management Science, 62(4), pp. 1000-1019.
Amir, R., Evstigneev, I. and Wooders, J., 2003, “Noncooperative versus cooperative R&D with en-
dogenous spillover rates,” Games and Economic Behavior, 42(2), 183-207.
Argyres, N.S. and Liebeskind, J.P., 2002, “Governance inseparability and the evolution of US biotech-
nology industry,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 47(2), 197-219.
Arora A., Fosfuri, A. and Gambardella, A., 2001, “Markets for technology and their implications for
corporate strategy,” Industrial and Corporate Change, 10(2), 419-451.
Arora, A., Gambardella, A., Pammolli, F. and Riccaboni, M., 2004a, “The nature and the extent of the
market for technology in biopharmaceuticals,” in: Cesaroni, F., Gambardella, A. and Garcia-Fontes,
W., editors, R&D, Innovation and Competitiveness in the European Chemical Industry, Ch. 7, Springer,
175-202.
Arora, A., Vogt, W.B. and Yoon, J., 2004b, “Does in-house R&D increase bargaining power? Evi-
dence from the pharmaceutical industry”. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=670304 or
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.670304
39
Azoulay, P., 2004. Capturing knowledge within and across firm boundaries: Evidence from clinical
development,” American Economic Review, 94(5), 1591-1612.
Bali, H., de Lima, B. and Yang, C., 2013, CROs (Contract Research Organisations) and other outsourced
pharmaceutical support services: M&A drivers and trends. Available at http://resultshealthcare.com
Bernheim, B.D. and Whinston, M.D., 1986a, “Common agency,” Econometrica, 54(4), 923-942.
Bernheim, B.D. and Whinston, M.D., 1986b, “Menu auctions, resource allocation, and economic in-
fluence,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101(1), 1-32.
Bernheim, B.D. and Whinston, M.D., 1998, “Exclusive dealing,” Journal of Political Economy, 106(1),
pp. 64-103.
Bernheim, B.D., Peleg, B. and Whinston, M.D., 1987, “Coalition-proof Nash equilibria: I Concepts,”
Journal of Economic Theory, 42(1), 1-12.
Bhattacharya, S. and Guriev, S., 2006, “Patents vs. trade secrets: Knowledge licensing and spillover,”
Journal of the European Economic Association, 4(6), 1112-1147.
Bhattacharya, S. and Guriev, S., 2013, “Control rights over intellectual property,” Journal of Industrial
Economics, 61(3), 564-591.
Billette de Villemeur, E. and Versaevel, B., 2003, “From private to public common agency,” Journal of
Economic Theory, 111(2), pp. 305-309.
Bloom, N., Schankerman, M. and Van Reenen, J., 2013, “Identifying technology spillovers and prod-
uct market rivalry,” Econometrica, 81(4), 1347-1393.
Ceccagnoli, M., Higgins, M. and Palermo, V., 2014, “Behind the scenes: sources of complementarity
in R&D,” Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 23(1), 125-148.
Cockburn, I.M. and Lerner, J, 2009, “The cost of capital for early- stage biotechnology ventures,” Con-
gressional Briefing. Available at: http://buchpedersen.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/TheCost-
of-Capital-for-Early-Stage-Biotechnology-VenturesCockburnLerner.pd f
Cockburn, I.M. and Henderson, R.M., 2001, “Scale and scope in drug development: Unpacking the
advantages of size in pharmaceutical research,” Journal of Health Economics, 20(6), 1033-57.
Cohen, W. M., Nelson, R.R. and Walsh, J.P., 2000, “Protecting their intellectual assets: Appropriability
conditions and why US manufacturing firms patent (or not),” National Bureau of Economic Research.
Comanor, W. and Scherer, F.M., 2013, “Mergers and innovation in the pharmaceutical industry,”
Journal of Health Economics, 32(1), 106-113.
d’Aspremont, C. and Jacquemin, A., 1988, “Cooperative and noncooperative R&D in duopoly with
spillovers,” American Economic Review, 78(5), 1133-1137.
Danzon, P., Nicholson, S. and Sousa Pereira, N., 2005, “Productivity in pharmaceutical-biotechnology
R&D: the role of experience and alliances,” Journal of Health Economics, 24(2), 317-339.
Danzon, P., Epstein, A. and Nicholson. S., 2007, “Mergers and acquisitions in the pharmaceutical and
biotech industries,” Managerial and Decision Economics, 28(4-5), 307-328.
Danzon, A. and Grabowski, H., 2012, “Mergers, acquisitions, and alliances,” in: Danzon, P. and
Nicholson, S., editors, The Economics of the Biopharmaceutical Industry, Ch. 18, Oxford University Press,
552-577.
40
DiMasi, J.A., Hansen, R.W., Grabowski, H.G., and Lasagna, L., 1991, “Cost of innovation in the phar-
maceutical industry,” Journal of Health Economics, 10(2),107-142.
DiMasi, J.A., Hansen, R.W., and Grabowski, H.G., 2003, “The price of innovation: new estimates of
drug development costs,” Journal of Health Economics, 22(2), 151-185.
DiMasi, J.A., Hansen, R.W., and Grabowski, H.G., 2016, “Innovation in the pharmaceutical industry:
New estimates of R&D costs,” Journal of Health Economics, 47(C), 20-33.
Folta, T.B., 1998, “Governance and uncertainty: The trade-off between administrative control and
commitment,” Strategic Management Journal, 19(11), 1007-28.
Galambos, L. and Sturchio, J.L., 1998, “Pharmaceutical firms and the transition to biotechnology: A
study in strategic innovation,” Business History Review, 72(2), 250-278.
Getz, K.A., 2007, “CRO shifts in the outsourcing market,” Applied Clinical Trials, 16(5), 35-38.
Golec, J. and Vernon, J.A., 2009, “Financial risk of the biotech industry versus the pharmaceutical
industry,” Applied Economics and Health Policy, 7(3), 155-65.
Guedj, I., 2005, “Ownership vs. contract: how vertical integration affects investment decisions in
pharmaceutical R&D,” McCombs Research Paper Series, No. FIN-01-06.
Hagedoorn, J. and Wang, N., 2012, “Is there complementarity or substitutability between internal
and external R&D strategies?,” Research Policy, 41(6), 1072-1083.
Hagedoorn, J. and Hesen, G., 2007, “Contract law and the governance of inter-firm technology part-
nerships: An analysis of different modes of partnering and their contractual implications,” Journal of
Management Studies, 44(3), 342-366.
Henderson, R.M. and Cockburn, I.M., 1996, “Scale, scope and spillovers: the determinants of research
productivity in drug discovery,” RAND Journal of Economics 27(1), 32-59.
Hernandez-Villafuerte, K., Sussex, J., Robin, E., Guthrie, S. and Wooding, S., 2017, “Economies of
scale and scope in publicly funded biomedical and health research: evidence from the literature,”
Health Research Policy and Systems 15(1), 1-17.
Henriques, I., 1990, “Cooperative and noncooperative R&D in duopoly with spillovers: Comment,”
American Economic Review, 80(3), 638-640.
Higgins, M.J., 2007, “The allocation of control rights in pharmaceutical alliances,” Journal of Corporate
Finance, 13(1), 58-75.
Higgins, M.J. and Rodriguez, D., 2006, “The outsourcing of R&D through acquisitions in the phar-
maceutical industry,” Journal of Financial Economics, 80(2), 351-383.
Ho, S.J., 2009, “Information leakage in innovation outsourcing,” R&D Management, 39(5), 431-443
Hoos, A., 2016, “Development of immuno-oncology drugs – from CTLA4 to PD1 to the next genera-
tions,” Nature Reviews Drug Discovery, 15, 235-247.
Keith, J.A., Bigger, L.A., Phyllis A.A., Maes, A.E. and Daems, R., 2013, “Delivering the promise of the
Decade of Vaccines: Opportunities and challenges in the development of high quality new vaccines,”
Vaccines, 31(S), B184-B193.
Lai, E., Riezman, R. and Wang, P., 2009, “Outsourcing of innovation,” Economic Theory, 38(3), 485-515.
Laussel, D. and Le Breton, M., 2001, “Conflict and cooperation: The structure of equilibrium payoffs
in common agency,” Journal of Economic Theory, 100(1), 93-128.
41
Lerner, J. and Merges, R.P., 1998, “The control of technology alliances: An empirical analysis of the
biotechnology industry,” Journal of Industrial Economics, 46(2), 125-156.
Macher, J.T. and Boerner, Ch. S., 2006, “Experience and scale and scope Economies: Trade-offs and
performance in development,” Strategic Management Journal, 27(9), 845-865.
Majewski, S., 2004, “How do consortia organize collaborative R&D?: Evidence from the national
cooperative research act,” Discussion Paper 483, Harvard Law School.
Martimort, D., 2007, “Multi-Contracting Mechanism Design,” in: Blundell, R., Newey W. and Person,
T., editors, Advances in Economic Theory Proceedings of the World Congress of the Econometric Society,
Cambridge University Press.
Mestre-Ferrandiz, J.M., Sussex, J. and Towse, A., 2012, The R&D Cost of a New Medicine. London:
Office of Health Economics.
Motta, M., 1992, “Cooperative R&D and vertical product differentiation, International Journal of Indus-
trial Organization, 10(4), 643-661.
Munos, B. 2009, “Lessons from 60 years of pharmaceutical innovation,”Nature Reviews Drug Discov-
ery, 8, 959-968.
Pammolli, F., Magazzini, L. and Riccaboni, M., 2011, “The productivity crisis in pharmaceutical
R&D,”Nature Revue Drug Discovery, 10(6), 428-438.
Pisano, G.P., 1991, “The governance of innovation: vertical integration and collaborative arrange-
ments in the biotechnology industry,” Research Policy, 20(3), 237-249.
Pisano, G.P., 2006a, Science Business: The Promise, the Reality and the Future of Biotech, Harvard Business
School Press.
Pisano, G.P., 2006b, “Can science be a business? Lessons from biotech,” Harvard Business Review,
84(10), 114-124.
Pisano, G.P., 2010, “The evolution of science-based business: Innovating how we innovate,” Industrial
and Corporate Change, 19(2), 465-482.
Pisano, G.P., 2015, “Big pharma needs to get busy in the lab: Blanket generalizations about biotech
firms being more efficient are unfounded,” The Wall Street Journal, March 19. Available at: www.wsj.com/
articles/gary-pisano-big-pharma-needs-to-get-busy-in-the-lab-1426805547.
Robinson, D.T. and Stuart, T.E., 2000, “The allocation of control in biotechnology strategic alliances,”
Organization Science Winter Conference. Available at: https://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/oswc/2000/papers/
thursday/TobyStuart.pdf
Robinson, D.T. and Stuart, T.E., 2007, “Financial contracting in biotech strategic alliances,” Journal of
Law and Economics, 50(3), 559-595.
Rothaermel, F.T., 2001, “Incumbent’s advantage through exploiting complementary assets via inter-
firm cooperation,” Strategic Management Journal, 22(6-7), 687-699.
Rydzewski, R.M., 2008, Real World Drug Discovery: A Chemist’s Guide to Biotech and Pharmaceutical
Research, Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Sancheti, S., Thomas, H., van den Heuvel, R. and Verhaeghe, A.J, 2018, R&D 2030: Reinvent innovation
and become an R&D front-runner by 2030, KPMG International. Available at: https://assets.kpmg.com/
content/dam/kpmg/xx/pdf/2018/11/r-and-d-2030-thriving-on-disruption-series.pdf
42
Scannell, J.W., Blanckley, A., Boldon, H. and Warrington, B., 2012, “Diagnosing the decline in phar-
maceutical R&D efficiency”, Nature Reviews Drug Discovery, 11, 191-200.
Scherer, F.M., 2001, “The link between gross profitability and pharmaceutical R&D spending,” Health
Affairs, 20(5), pp. 216-220.
Scherer, F.M., 2010, “Pharmaceutical innovation,” in: Hall, B.H. and Rosenberg, N., editors, Handbook
of The Economics of Innovation, Vol. 1, Ch. 12, pp. 539-574.
Scherer, F.M., 2011, “R&D costs and productivity in biopharmaceuticals,” Faculty Research Working
Paper Series, Harvard Kennedy School, RWP11-046.
Schuhmacher, A., Gassmann, O. and Hinder, M., 2016, “Changing R&D models in research-based
pharmaceutical companies,” Journal of Translational Medecine, 14(1), pp. 105-115.
Shuchman, M., 2007, “Commercializing Clinical Trials Risks and Benefits of the CRO Boom,” New
England Journal of Medicine, 357(14), 1365-1368.
Spulber, D.F., 2013, “How do competitive pressures affect incentives to innovate when there is a
market for inventions?,” Journal of Political Economy, 121(6), 1007-1054.
Stuart, T.E., Hoang H. and Ralph C.H., 1999, “Interorganizational endorsements and the performance
of entrepreneurial ventures,” Administrative Science Quarterly, 44(2), pp. 315-349.
Symeonidis, G., 2003, “Comparing Bertrand and Cournot equilibria in a differentiated duopoly with
product R&D,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 21(1), 39-55.
Tang, J., Shalabi, A. and Hubbard-Lucey, M., 2018, “Comprehensive analysis of the clinical immuno-
oncology landscape,” Annals of Oncology, 29, pp. 84-91.
Taylor, K., Shah, S. and Stockbridge, M., 2016, Balancing the R&D Equation: Measuring the Return from
Pharmaceutical Innovation, Deloitte Centre for Health Solutions. Available at: https://www2.deloitte.com/
content/dam/Deloitte/uk/Documents/life-sciences-health-care/deloitte-uk-measuring-the-return-
pharma-report-2016.pdf
Thakor, R. T., Anaya, N., Zhang, Y., Vilanilam, C., Siah, K. W., Wong, C. H., and Lo, A. W., 2017,
“Just how good an investment is the biopharmaceutical sector?,” Nature Biotechnology, 35(12), pp.
1149-1157.
Topkis, D., 1995, “Comparative statics of the firm,” Journal of Economic Theory, 67(2), 370-401.
Vencatachellum, D. and Versaevel, B., 2009, “R&D delegation in a duopoly with spillovers,” The B.E.
Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 9(1) (Contributions), Article 55.
Wilson, E., Wallach, M., and Willoughby, R., 2016, CRO Industry Primer, Credit Suisse. Available at:
https://research-doc.credit-suisse.com
A Appendix
We first develop the derivatives
dy∗j
dxj
and dy
∗
i
dxj
, which are needed to prove Propositions 1 to 5 afterwards.
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A.1 Derivation of
dy∗j
dxj
and dy
∗
i
dxj
As the arguments xi and yi enter additively into gi (hence gˆi), we have
∂gˆi
(
xi + y∗i , xj, y
∗
j
)
∂xi
− ∂ fˆi (y
∗
i )
∂yi
= 0, (39)
and similarly
∂gˆj
(
xj + y∗j , xi, y
∗
i
)
∂xj
−
∂ fˆ j
(
y∗j
)
∂yj
= 0, (40)
where the Nash strategies y∗i = y
∗
i
(
xi, xj
)
and y∗j = y
∗
j
(
xi, xj
)
result from the two firms’ non-
cooperative profit-maximization in their respective internal R&D levels, for i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i.
Differentiating (39) and (40) w.r.t. xj, and using again si = xi + yi in gˆi, and sj = xj + yj in gˆj, we
obtain the system of equations ∂
2 gˆi
∂xi∂yj
∂2 gˆi
∂x2i
− ∂2 fˆi
∂y2i
∂2 gˆj
∂x2j
− ∂2 fˆ j
∂y2j
∂2 gˆj
∂xj∂yi

 dy∗jdxj
dy∗i
dxj
 =
 − ∂2 gˆi∂xi∂xj
− ∂2 gˆj
∂x2j
 ,
where gˆi = gˆi
(
xi + y∗i , xj, y
∗
j
)
, gˆj = gˆj
(
xj + y∗j , xi, y
∗
i
)
, fˆi = fˆi (y∗i ), and fˆ j = fˆ j(y
∗
j ), for clarity.
This yields the solution
 dy∗jdxj
dy∗i
dxj
 = 1
∆
 − ∂
2 gˆj
∂xj∂yi
∂2 gˆi
∂x2i
− ∂2 fˆi
∂y2i
∂2 gˆj
∂x2j
− ∂2 fˆ j
∂y2j
− ∂2 gˆi∂xi∂yj

 − ∂2 gˆi∂xi∂xj
− ∂2 gˆj
∂x2j
 (41)
where
∆ =
(
∂2 gˆi
∂x2i
− ∂
2 fˆi
∂y2i
)(
∂2 gˆj
∂x2j
− ∂
2 fˆ j
∂y2j
)
− ∂
2 gˆi
∂xi∂yj
∂2 gˆj
∂xj∂yi
. (42)
We thus have
dy∗j
dxj
=
1
∆
[
∂2 gˆj
∂xj∂yi
∂2 gˆi
∂xi∂xj
−
(
∂2 gˆi
∂x2i
− ∂
2 fˆi
∂y2i
)
∂2 gˆj
∂x2j
]
, (43)
dy∗i
dxj
=
1
∆
[
∂2 gˆi
∂xi∂yj
∂2 gˆj
∂x2j
−
(
∂2 gˆj
∂x2j
− ∂
2 fˆ j
∂y2j
)
∂2 gˆi
∂xi∂xj
]
. (44)
We know that
∂2 fˆi(y∗i )
∂y2i
≥ 0 (by assumption) and ∂2 gˆi
∂x2i
− ∂2 fˆi
∂y2i
< 0 (second-order condition), which
holds also for firm j. As ∂
2 gˆi
∂xi∂yj
and ∂
2 gˆj
∂xj∂yi
have the same sign (by assumption),
∥∥∥ ∂2 gˆi
∂x2i
∥∥∥ ≥ ∥∥∥ ∂2 gˆi∂xi∂yj ∥∥∥ and
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∥∥∥∥ ∂2 gˆj∂x2j
∥∥∥∥ ≥ ∥∥∥ ∂2 gˆj∂xj∂yi ∥∥∥ (see (7)), we obtain from (42) that ∆ ≥ 0.50
Moreover, we know also from Henriques (1990) that the reaction functions in the internal R&D
space
(
yi, yj
)
cross “correctly”, so that the Nash equilibrium (y∗i , y
∗
j ) is stable, only if∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂2
[
gˆi
(
xi + yi, xj, yj
)− fˆi (yi)]
∂y2i
/
∂2
[
gˆi
(
xi + yi, xj, yj
)− fˆi (yi)]
∂yi∂yj
∣∣∣∣∣∣ < 1, (45)
for i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i.
Again, the argument si = xi + yi in gˆi, together with fˆi being a function of yi only, imply that
∂2[gˆi(xi+yi ,xj,yj)− fˆi(yi)]
∂yi∂yj
=
∂2 gˆi(xi+yi ,xj,yj)
∂yi∂yj
=
∂2 gˆi(xi+yi ,xj,yj)
∂xi∂yj
, so that (45) becomes
∣∣∣( ∂2 gˆi
∂x2i
− ∂2 fˆi
∂y2i
)
/ ∂
2 gˆi
∂xi∂yj
∣∣∣ <
1. The latter inequality, together with ∂
2 gˆi
∂x2i
− ∂2 fˆi
∂y2i
< 0 for i = 1, 2 (second-order condition) and
∂2 gˆi
∂xi∂yj
∂2 gˆj
∂xj∂yi
≥ 0 for i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i (partial cross-derivatives, for both firms, have the same sign
by assumption) imply from (42) that ∆ is nonzero at (y∗i , y
∗
j ), and the derivatives in (43) and (44) are
well defined.
Suppose now that ∂
2 gˆi
∂x2i
is nonzero for i = 1, 2 (the case ∂
2 gˆi
∂x2i
= 0 is considered below in the proof of
Proposition 1). Then, a careful reorganization of terms in the expression of
dy∗j
dxj
in (43) leads to
dy∗j
dxj
=
− ∂2 gˆj
∂x2j
∂2 gˆj
∂x2j
− ∂2 fˆ j
∂y2j
1− ∂
2 gˆj
∂xj∂yi
− ∂2 gˆj
∂x2j
Njj
∆
 , (46)
where Njj =
∂2 gˆi
∂xi∂yj
∂2 gˆj
∂x2j
−
(
∂2 gˆj
∂x2j
− ∂2 fˆ j
∂y2j
)
∂2 gˆi
∂xi∂xj
.
Similarly, a reorganization of terms in the expression of dy
∗
i
dxj
in (44) leads to
dy∗i
dxj
=
− ∂2 gˆi∂xi∂xj
∂2 gˆi
∂x2i
− ∂2 fˆi
∂y2i
1− ∂2 gˆi∂xi∂yj
− ∂2 gˆi∂xi∂xj
Nij
∆
 , (47)
where Nij =
∂2 gˆj
∂xj∂yi
∂2 gˆi
∂xi∂xj
−
(
∂2 gˆi
∂x2i
− ∂2 fˆi
∂y2i
)
∂2 gˆj
∂x2j
.
Both expressions in (46) and (47) are well defined because the denominators of their respective
first terms are nonzero by assumption (second-order condition for a unique y∗(x)).
50From the expression in (2), the argument si = xi + yi of the gross profit function gi, hence also of the reduced-form gˆi,
implies that inequalities (6 - 7) can be rewritten by substituting the derivatives with respect to xi for the ones with respect
to yi. Thus ∂2 gˆi/∂yi∂xi = ∂2 gˆi/∂x2i , ∂
2 gˆi/∂yi∂xj = ∂2 gˆi/∂xi∂xj, and ∂2 gˆi/∂yi∂yj = ∂2 gˆi/∂xi∂yj, for i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i. We
make use of these substitutions throughout the appendix.
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A.2 Proof of Proposition 1.
We want to establish that dy
∗
i
dxi
< 0 ⇔ ∂2 gˆi
∂s2i
< 0, where si = xi + yi, and with gˆi = gˆi
(
xi + y∗i , xj, y
∗
j
)
,
gˆj = gˆj
(
xj + y∗j , xi, y
∗
i
)
, fˆi = fˆi (y∗i ), and fˆ j = fˆ j(y
∗
j ), i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i, throughout this section for
clarity. There are three cases:
Case 1: ∂
2 gˆi
∂s2i
= 0. Recalling from si = xi + yi in gˆi that
∂2 gˆi
∂yi∂xi
= ∂
2 gˆi
∂x2i
and ∂
2 gˆi
∂yi∂xj
= ∂
2 gˆi
∂xi∂xj
, from (6) we have∥∥∥ ∂2 gˆi∂yi∂xi ∥∥∥ = ∥∥∥ ∂2 gˆi∂x2i ∥∥∥ = 0 ≥ ∥∥∥ ∂2 gˆi∂yi∂xj ∥∥∥ = ∥∥∥ ∂2 gˆi∂xi∂xj ∥∥∥, implying that ∂2 gˆi∂xi∂xj = 0. Then, by inserting ∂2 gˆj∂x2j = 0 and
∂2 gˆi
∂xi∂xj
= 0 into (43) and (44) we find
dy∗j
dxj
=
dy∗i
dxj
= 0. (48)
Case 2: ∂
2 gˆi
∂s2i
< 0. (i) Here
∂2 fˆi(y∗i )
∂y2i
≥ 0 implies that ∂2 gˆi
∂x2i
− ∂2 fˆi
∂y2i
≤ ∂2 gˆi
∂x2i
< 0, while
∥∥∥ ∂2 gˆi
∂x2i
∥∥∥ ≥ ∥∥∥ ∂2 gˆi∂xi∂xj ∥∥∥ by
assumption from (7) implies that ∂
2 gˆi
∂x2i
≤ ∂2 gˆi∂xi∂xj ≤ 0, and by transitivity
∂2 gˆi
∂x2i
− ∂2 fˆi
∂y2i
≤ ∂2 gˆi∂xi∂xj ≤ 0. (ii) As
∂2 gˆj
∂x2j
< 0, here
∥∥∥∥ ∂2 gˆj∂x2j
∥∥∥∥ ≥ ∥∥∥ ∂2 gˆj∂xj∂yi ∥∥∥ by assumption from (6) leads to ∂2 gˆj∂x2j ≤ ∂2 gˆj∂xj∂yi ≤ 0. From (i) and (ii) we
obtain that
−
(
∂2 gˆi
∂x2i
− ∂
2 fˆi
∂y2i
)
∂2 gˆj
∂x2j
≤ − ∂
2 gˆi
∂xi∂xj
∂2 gˆj
∂xj∂yi
≤ 0,
with an equality sign (the 1st one) if and only if ∂
2 gˆj
∂x2j
=
∂2 gˆj
∂xj∂yi
< 0 and ∂
2 gˆi
∂x2i
− ∂2 fˆi
∂y2i
= ∂
2 gˆi
∂xi∂xj
< 0.
Multiplying through by ∂
2 gˆj
∂x2j
− ∂2 fˆ j
∂y2j
< 0, adding ∂
2 gˆj
∂x2j
∂2 gˆj
∂xj∂yi
∂2 gˆi
∂xi∂yj
on both sides, and reorganizing terms,
leads to
1 ≥
∂2 gˆj
∂xj∂yi
− ∂2 gˆj
∂x2j
Njj
∆
,
so that the expression between brackets is non-negative (46) is positive, and finally we have
dy∗j
dxj
= −
− ∂2 gˆj
∂x2j
∂2 gˆj
∂x2j
− ∂2 fˆ j
∂y2j︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
1− ∂
2 gˆj
∂xj∂yi
− ∂2 gˆj
∂x2j
Njj
∆

︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
≤ 0, (49)
again with an equality sign if and only if ∂
2 gˆj
∂x2j
=
∂2 gˆj
∂xj∂yi
< 0 and ∂
2 gˆi
∂x2i
− ∂2 fˆi
∂y2i
= ∂
2 gˆi
∂xi∂xj
< 0, where the latter
equality implies that ∂
2 fˆi
∂y2i
= 0.
Case 3: ∂
2 gˆi
∂s2i
> 0 (i = 1, 2). Here we have
(
∂2 gˆi
∂x2i
− ∂2 fˆi
∂y2i
)
∂2 gˆj
∂x2j
< 0, which together with ∂
2 gˆj
∂xj∂yi
∂2 gˆi
∂xi∂xj
≥ 0
(partial cross-derivatives have the same sign by assumption) implies that
(
∂2 gˆi
∂x2i
− ∂2 fˆi
∂y2i
)
∂2 gˆj
∂x2j
<
∂2 gˆj
∂xj∂yi
∂2 gˆi
∂xi∂xj
.
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Multiplying through by ∂
2 gˆj
∂x2j
− ∂2 fˆ j
∂y2j
< 0, adding − ∂2 gˆj
∂x2j
∂2 gˆj
∂xj∂yi
∂2 gˆi
∂xi∂yj
on both sides of the inequality sign,
and reorganizing terms, leads to
1 >
∂2 gˆj
∂xj∂yi
− ∂2 gˆj
∂x2j
Njj
∆
, (50)
so that the expression between brackets in (46) is positive. Then − ∂2 gˆj
∂x2j
(
∂2 gˆj
∂x2j
− ∂2 fˆ j
∂y2j
)−1
> 0 implies
finally that
dy∗j
dxj
=
− ∂2 gˆj
∂x2j
∂2 gˆj
∂x2j
− ∂2 fˆ j
∂y2j︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
1− ∂
2 gˆj
∂xj∂yi
− ∂2 gˆj
∂x2j
Njj
∆

︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
> 0. (51)
The sign of
dy∗j
dxj
in (48), (49) and (51), establishes Proposition 1. 
A.3 Lemmas
The technical results introduced in this section are needed to prove Propositions 2, 3, and 5. The first
two lemmas establish a connection between properties of gˆi (x, y) and gˆi (x, y∗(x))− fˆi (y∗i (x)).
Lemma A.1 Suppose that ∂
2 gˆi
∂x2i
≤ 0, i = 1, 2. Then d[gˆi(xi+y
∗
i ,xj,y
∗
j )− fˆi(y∗i )]
dxj
, i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i, has the same
sign as
∂gˆi(xi+yi ,xj,yj)
∂xj
and
∂gˆi(xi+yi ,xj,yj)
∂yj
.
Proof. By the envelope theorem, as y∗i = y
∗
i
(
xi, xj
)
maximizes gˆi
(
xi + yi, xj, yj
)− fˆi (yi), we have
d
[
gˆi
(
xi + y∗i , xj, y
∗
j
)
− fˆi (y∗i )
]
dxj
=
∂gˆi
(
xi + y∗i , xj, y
∗
j
)
∂xj
+
∂gˆi
(
xi + y∗i , xj, y
∗
j
)
∂yj
dy∗j
dxj
. (52)
Our objective is to determine the sign of the RHS expression in (52). Given the (same) sign of
∂gˆi(xi+y∗i ,xj,y∗j )
∂xj
and
∂gˆi(xi+y∗i ,xj,y∗j )
∂yj
, we need only characterizing
dy∗j
dxj
.
First, if ∂
2 gˆi
∂x2i
= 0 (i = 1, 2), we know from (48) that
dy∗j
dxj
= 0, which is sufficient to conclude.
Next, if ∂
2 gˆi
∂x2i
< 0 (i = 1, 2), we know from (49) that
dy∗j
dxj
≤ 0. Then toward a contradiction we
suppose that
∥∥∥ dy∗jdxj ∥∥∥ > 1, or equivalently here dy∗jdxj < −1. Developing the expression in (46) then leads
to
∂2 gˆj
∂xj∂yi
(
∂2 gˆi
∂xi∂yj
− ∂
2 gˆi
∂xi∂xj
)
> −∂
2 fˆ j
∂y2j︸︷︷︸
≥0
(
∂2 gˆi
∂x2i
− ∂
2 fˆi (y∗i )
∂y2i
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
. (53)
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As ∂
2 gˆi
∂xi∂yj
and ∂
2 gˆi
∂xi∂xj
have the same sign, and
∥∥∥ ∂2 gˆi∂xi∂xj ∥∥∥ ≥ ∥∥∥ ∂2 gˆi∂xi∂yj ∥∥∥ (model specifications in (6-7)), we
know that the expression on the LHS of the strict inequality sign in (A.8) is non-positive. How-
ever, ∂
2 fˆ j
∂y2j
≥ 0 (by assumption) and ∂2 gˆi
∂x2i
− ∂
2 fˆi(y∗i )
∂y2i
< 0 (second-order condition) imply that the prod-
uct on the RHS is always non-negative, a contradiction. Hence
∥∥∥ dy∗jdxj ∥∥∥ ≤ 1. This, together with∥∥∥∥ ∂gˆi(xi+y∗i ,xj,y∗j )∂xj
∥∥∥∥ ≥ ∥∥∥∥ ∂gˆi(xi+y∗i ,xj,y∗j )∂yj
∥∥∥∥ (model specifications), is sufficient to conclude that d[gˆi(xi+y∗i ,xj,y∗j )− fˆi(y∗i )]dxj
in (52) has the same sign as
∂gˆi(xi+yi ,xj,yj)
∂xj
and
∂gˆi(xi+yi ,xj,yj)
∂yj
. 
Lemma A.2 Suppose that ∂
2 gˆi
∂x2i
≤ 0, i = 1, 2. If ∂gˆi(xi+yi ,xj,yj)∂xj ≥ 0 and
∂gˆi(xi+yi ,xj,yj)
∂yj
≥ 0, i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i,
then
d[gˆi(xi+y∗i ,xj,y∗j )− fˆi(y∗i )]
dxi
≥ 0 also.
Proof. By the envelope theorem, as y∗i = y
∗
i
(
xi, xj
)
maximizes gˆi
(
xi + yi, xj, yj
)− fˆi (yi), we have
d
[
gˆi
(
xi + y∗i , xj, y
∗
j
)
− fˆi (y∗i )
]
dxi
=
∂gˆi
(
xi + y∗i , xj, y
∗
j
)
∂xi
+
∂gˆi
(
xi + y∗i , xj, y
∗
j
)
∂yj
dy∗j
dxi
, (54)
where
∂gˆi(xi+y∗i ,xj,y∗j )
∂xi
≥ 0 as a model specification, and ∂gˆi(xi+y
∗
i ,xj,y
∗
j )
∂yj
≥ 0 as an assumption of the
present lemma. In order to determine the sign of the RHS expression in (54), we thus need only
characterizing
dy∗j
dxi
.
First, if ∂
2 gˆi
∂x2i
= 0 (i = 1, 2), we know from (48) that
dy∗j
dxi
= 0, which is sufficient to conclude.
Next, if ∂
2 gˆi
∂x2i
< 0 (i = 1, 2), recall from (47) in Section A.1 that
dy∗j
dxi
=
− ∂2 gˆj∂xj∂xi
∂2 gˆj
∂x2j
− ∂2 fˆ j
∂y2j
1− ∂
2 gˆj
∂xj∂yi
− ∂2 gˆj∂xj∂xi
Nji
∆
 , (55)
where Nji =
∂2 gˆi
∂xi∂yj
∂2 gˆj
∂xj∂xi
−
(
∂2 gˆj
∂x2j
− ∂2 fˆ j
∂y2j
)
∂2 gˆi
∂x2i
. There are two possible cases that depend on the sign of
∂2 gˆj
∂xj∂xi
.
(i) If ∂
2 gˆj
∂xj∂xi
≥ 0 (i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i), as ∂2 gˆj
∂x2j
− ∂2 fˆ j
∂y2j
< 0 we have − ∂2 gˆj∂xj∂xi /
(
∂2 gˆj
∂x2j
− ∂2 fˆ j
∂y2j
)
≥ 0. Then, toward
a contradiction, suppose that the expression between brackets in (55) is negative. This, together with∥∥∥ ∂2 gˆj∂xj∂yi / ∂2 gˆj∂xj∂xi ∥∥∥ ≤ 1 (model specifications in (6-7)), implies that Nji∆ < −1, which can be rewritten as
∂2 gˆi
∂xi∂yj
(
∂2 gˆj
∂xj∂xi
− ∂
2 gˆj
∂xj∂yi
)
<
∂2 fˆi
∂y2i
(
∂2 gˆj
∂x2j
− ∂
2 fˆ j
∂y2j
)
,
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where the expression on the LHS of the inequality sign is non-negative, whereas the expression on
the RHS is non-positive, a contradiction. It follows that
dy∗j
dxi
≥ 0, which is sufficient to conclude
directly that
d[gˆi(xi+y∗i ,xj,y∗j )− fˆi(y∗i )]
dxi
in (54) is non-negative also.
(ii) If ∂
2 gˆj
∂xj∂xi
< 0 (i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i), unlike in the previous case the model specifications do not imply
that
dy∗j
dxi
≥ 0. Then, toward a contradiction, whenever dy
∗
j
dxi
< 0 suppose that
∥∥∥ dy∗jdxi ∥∥∥ > 1, or equivalently
here − dy
∗
j
dxi
> 1. From (55), by using ∆ > 0 (see (42) and related subsequent comments in Section A.1)
we have
− ∂2 gˆj∂xj∂yi
∂2 gˆi
∂x2i
+
∂2 gˆj
∂xj∂xi
(
∂2 gˆi
∂x2i
− ∂2 fˆi
∂y2i
)
(
∂2 gˆi
∂x2i
− ∂2 fˆi
∂y2i
)(
∂2 gˆj
∂x2j
− ∂2 fˆ j
∂y2j
)
− ∂2 gˆi∂xi∂yj
∂2 gˆj
∂xj∂yi
> 1,
which can be rewritten as
− ∂
2 gˆj
∂xj∂yi
∂2 gˆi
∂x2i
+
∂2 gˆj
∂xj∂xi
(
∂2 gˆi
∂x2i
− ∂
2 fˆi
∂y2i
)
>
(
∂2 gˆi
∂x2i
− ∂
2 fˆi
∂y2i
)(
∂2 gˆj
∂x2j
− ∂
2 fˆ j
∂y2j
)
− ∂
2 gˆi
∂xi∂yj
∂2 gˆj
∂xj∂yi
,
with ∂
2 gˆi
∂x2i
and ∂
2 gˆi
∂xi∂yj
both negative here. Moreover we know by assumption from (7) that
∥∥∥ ∂2 gˆi
∂x2i
∥∥∥ ≥∥∥∥ ∂2 gˆi∂xi∂yj ∥∥∥. Therefore, substituting ∂2 gˆi∂x2i for ∂2 gˆi∂xi∂yj in the last term above, by transitivity we obtain
− ∂
2 gˆj
∂xj∂yi
∂2 gˆi
∂x2i
+
∂2 gˆj
∂xj∂xi
(
∂2 gˆi
∂x2i
− ∂
2 fˆi
∂y2i
)
>
(
∂2 gˆi
∂x2i
− ∂
2 fˆi
∂y2i
)(
∂2 gˆj
∂x2j
− ∂
2 fˆ j
∂y2j
)
− ∂
2 gˆj
∂xj∂yi
∂2 gˆi
∂x2i
,
which simplifies to
∂2 gˆj
∂xj∂xi
<
∂2 gˆj
∂x2j
− ∂
2 fˆ j
∂y2j
≤ ∂
2 gˆj
∂x2j
≤ 0.
As the latter inequalities contradict the initial assumption in (6) that
∥∥∥ ∂2 gˆj∂xj∂xi ∥∥∥ ≤
∥∥∥∥ ∂2 gˆj∂x2j
∥∥∥∥, it must be
the case that
∥∥∥ dy∗jdxi ∥∥∥ ≤ 1. This, together with the model specification in (4-5) that
∥∥∥∥ ∂gˆi(xi+y∗i ,xj,y∗j )∂xi
∥∥∥∥ ≥∥∥∥∥ ∂gˆi(xi+y∗i ,xj,y∗j )∂yj
∥∥∥∥, is sufficient to conclude that d[gˆi(xi+y∗i ,xj,y∗j )− fˆi(y∗i )]dxi in (54) is non-negative. 
The next two lemmas were established in Laussel and Le Breton (2001). We restate them in the
notation of this paper for a self-contained appendix:51
Lemma A.3 If v is superadditive, that is Λ ≥ v({1}) + v({2}), then in all TSPNE v∗0 = 0, and all vectors
of equilibrium profits (v∗1 , v
∗
2) are such that v
∗
1 + v
∗
2 = Λ.
51With two principals, the convexity condition introduced in Laussel and Le Breton (2001, Proposition 3.2, p. 103) coin-
cides with the superadditivity of v in our model, and the strong subadditivity property (Proposition 3.3, p. 104) coincides
here with strict subadditivity.
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Lemma A.4 If v is strictly subadditive, that is Λ < v({1}) + v({2}), then in all TSPNE v∗0 > 0, and there
exists a unique vector of equilibrium profits (v∗1 , v
∗
2), where v
∗
i = Λ− v({j}), i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i.
A.4 Proof of Propositions 2 and 3.
Proof of Proposition 2. We first use Lemmas A.1 and A.2, and finally Lemma A.3, in order to
extend a proof by Billette de Villemeur and Versaevel (2003, Proposition 1) to establish the (weak)
superadditivity of v(.). Then we show that the equilibrium payoffs (v∗1 , v
∗
2) exist that are (weakly)
higher than the respective standalone values (v1, v2).
1) Denote by X∗{i} the set of R&D levels that maximize the expected joint profit of firm i and the lab,
that is
X∗{i} = arg maxx
(
max
yi
[
gˆi
(
xi + yi, xj, yj
)− fˆi (yi)]− fˆ0 (x)) .
Define a = (a1, a2) ∈ X∗{1} and b = (b1, b2) ∈ X∗{2}.
We know from the initial model specifications that
∂gˆi(xi+yi ,xj,yj)
∂si
≥ 0, where si = xi + yi. More-
over, it is assumed in this proposition that ∂
2 gˆi
∂x2i
≤ 0 (non-increasing returns to R&D), and from
(13) that
∂gˆi(xi+yi ,xj,yj)
∂xj
≥ 0 and ∂gˆi(xi+yi ,xj,yj)∂yj ≥ 0 (non-negative R&D externalities). It follows that
gˆi(xi + y∗i (x) , xj, y
∗
j (x)) − fˆi (y∗i (x)) is non-decreasing in xj from Lemma A.1, and also in xi from
Lemma A.2. Therefore, for u = (u1, u2), with u1 = a1 ∨ b1 and u2 = a2 ∨ b2, we have
gˆ1 (a1 + y∗1 (a) , a2,y
∗
2 (a))− fˆ1 (y∗1 (a)) ≤ gˆ1 (u1 + y∗1 (u) , u2,y∗2 (u))− fˆ1 (y∗1 (u)) , (56a)
gˆ2 (b2 + y∗2 (b) , b1,y∗1 (b))− fˆ2 (y∗2 (b)) ≤ gˆ2 (u2 + y∗2 (u) , u1,y∗1 (u))− fˆ2 (y∗2 (u)) . (56b)
The non-negative cross-derivative in (12) implies the weak submodularity of fˆ0 (Topkis, 1995). This
property, with (56a) and (56b), together lead to
gˆ1 (a1 + y∗1 (a) , a2,y
∗
2 (a))− fˆ1 (y∗1 (a))− fˆ0 (a)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=v({1})
+ gˆ2 (b2 + y∗2 (b) , b1,y∗1 (b))− fˆ2 (y∗1 (b))− fˆ0 (b)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=v({2})
≤ gˆ1 (u1 + y∗1 (u) , u2,y∗2 (u))− fˆ1 (y∗1 (u)) + gˆ2 (u2 + y∗2 (u) , u1,y∗1 (u))− fˆ2 (y∗2 (u))− fˆ0 (u)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤v({1,2})
− fˆ0 (a ∧ b)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
,
which in turn establishes that v({1}) + v({2}) ≤ v({1, 2}). The conclusion that v∗0 = 0 < v∗1 + v∗2 =
v({1, 2}) follows directly from Lemma A.3.
2) To check that v∗i ≥ vi, recall that vi = Eθ [g˜j(x∗j , θ)], where x∗j ∈ arg maxx Eθ [g˜j (x, θ) − f0(x, θ)]
describes the lab’s R&D levels when firm j is assumed to have exclusive access to it (for i, j = 1, 2, j 6=
i). Moreover, by assumption firm i’s exclusive control of the lab dominates the standalone value, that
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is v({i}) ≥ vi. Then from the superadditivity of v(.), together with v∗1 + v∗2 = v({1, 2}) as established
above, we have directly
v1 + v2 ≤ v({1}) + v({2}) ≤ v({1, 2}) = v∗1 + v∗2 ,
and the equilibrium set {(v∗1 , v∗2) | v∗1 + v∗2 = Λ, v∗1 ≥ v1, v∗2 ≥ v2} is nonempty. 
Proof of Proposition 3. We first use Lemmas A.1 and A.4 to prove the strict subadditivity of
v(.), before establishing that the equilibrium payoffs (v∗1 , v
∗
2) are (weakly) higher than the respective
standalone values (v1, v2).
1) Pick any x∗ = (x∗1 , x
∗
2) in X
∗
{1,2}, the set of R&D levels that maximize the expected industry profit.
It is assumed in this proposition that ∂
2 gˆi
∂x2i
≤ 0 (non-increasing returns to R&D), and from (17)
that that
∂gˆi(xi+yi ,xj,yj)
∂xj
≤ 0 and ∂gˆi(xi+yi ,xj,yj)∂yj ≤ 0 (weakly negative R&D externalities). It follows from
Lemma A.1 that the net profit expression gˆi(xi + y∗i (x), xj, y
∗
j (x)) − fˆi (y∗i (x)) is non-decreasing so
that, for all x∗1 , x
∗
2 ≥ 0,
gˆ1 (x∗1 + y
∗
1 (x
∗) , x∗2 , y∗2 (x∗))− fˆ1 (y∗1 (x∗)) ≤ gˆ1 (x∗1 + y∗1 (x∗1 , 0) , 0, y∗2 (x∗1 , 0))− fˆ1 (y∗1 (x∗1 , 0)) , (57a)
gˆ2(x∗2 + y∗2 (x∗) , x∗1 , y
∗
1 (x
∗))− fˆ2 (y∗2 (x∗)) ≤ gˆ2 (x∗2 + y∗2 (0, x∗2) , 0, y∗1 (0, x∗2))− fˆ2 (y∗2 (0, x∗2)) . (57b)
The negative cross-derivative in (16) implies the strict supermodularity of fˆ0 (Topkis, 1995), with
fˆ0 (0, 0) = 0. This property, together with (57a) and (57b), lead to
gˆ1(x∗1 + y
∗
1 (x
∗) , x∗2 , y∗2 (x∗))− fˆ1 (y∗1 (x∗)) + gˆ2(x∗2 + y∗2 (x∗) , x∗1 , y∗1 (x∗))− fˆ2 (y∗2 (x∗))− fˆ0 (x∗1 , x∗2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=v({1,2})
< gˆ1 (x∗1 + y
∗
1 (x
∗
1 , 0) , 0, y
∗
2 (x
∗
1 , 0))− fˆ1 (y∗1 (x∗1 , 0))− fˆ0 (x∗1 , 0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤v({1})
+ gˆ2 (x∗2 + y∗2 (0, x∗2) , 0, y∗1 (0, x
∗
2))− fˆ2 (y∗2 (0, x∗2))− fˆ0 (0, x∗2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤v({2})
,
which establishes that v ({1, 2}) < v ({1}) + v ({2}). The conclusion that v∗0 > 0 and v∗i = Λ −
v({j}), i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i, follows directly from Lemma A.4.
2) For any x∗1 and x
∗
2 , by definition of v(.) we have
Eθ [g˜1(x∗1 , θ) + g˜2(x
∗
1 , θ)− f0(x∗1 , θ)] ≤ v({1, 2}),
Eθ [g˜1(x∗2 , θ) + g˜2(x∗2 , θ)− f0(x∗2 , θ)] ≤ v({1, 2}).
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Then by reorganizing terms, and recalling that v({i}) = Eθ [g˜i(x∗i , θ)− f0(x∗i , θ)] and vi = Eθ
[
g˜i(x∗j , θ)
]
,
where x∗j ∈ arg maxx Eθ
[
g˜j (x, θ)− f0 (x, θ)
]
, i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i, we obtain
v({1}) + v2 ≤ v({1, 2}),
v({2}) + v1 ≤ v({1, 2}),
which, together with v∗i = Λ− v({j}), i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i, as established above, implies that vi ≤ v∗i . 
A.5 Bilateral profit maximization
We demonstrate that an element of
X(t˜i, tj) = arg maxx
{
Eθ
[
t˜i (x, θ) + tj (x, θ)− f0 (x, θ)
]}
,
the set of actions that maximize the expected payoff to the agent (the lab) given the principals’ (firms’)
strategies (t˜i, tj), is also an element of
X∗{i} = arg maxx
{
Eθ
[
g˜i (x, θ) + tj (x, θ)− f0 (x, θ)
]}
,
the set of actions that maximize the joint payoff to the agent and principal i. That is:
Lemma A.5 If x˜ an element of X(t˜i, tj), then x˜ is also an element of X∗{i}.
Proof. We suppose that x˜ /∈ X∗{i}, and look for a contradiction. In equilibrium, the strategy t˜i is
truthful relative to the equilibrium choice x˜, that is t˜i (x, θ) = sup {0, g˜i (x, θ)− [g˜i (x˜, θ)− t˜i (x˜, θ)]},
for all θ ∈ Θ, implying that
t˜i (x, θ) ≥ g˜i (x, θ)− [g˜i (x˜, θ)− t˜i (x˜, θ)] ,
all θ ∈ Θ, all x. This holds in particular for any given x∗ ∈ X∗{i}, so that t˜i (x∗, θ) ≥ g˜i (x∗, θ) −
[g˜i (x˜, θ)− t˜i (x˜, θ)] , all θ ∈ Θ. Adding tj (x∗, θ)− f0 (x∗, θ) on each side of the inequality, leads to
v0 (x∗, θ) ≥ g˜i (x∗, θ) + tj (x∗, θ)− f0 (x∗, θ)− g˜i (x˜, θ) + t˜i (x˜, θ) .
By introducing tj (x˜, θ)− f0 (x˜, θ) on the right-hand side only, and reorganizing terms, we obtain
v0 (x∗, θ) ≥
[
g˜i (x∗, θ) + tj (x∗, θ)− f0 (x∗, θ)
]
− [g˜i (x˜, θ) + tj (x˜, θ)− f0 (x˜, θ)]+ t˜i (x˜, θ) + tj (x˜, θ)− f0 (x˜, θ) ,
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all θ ∈ Θ. Obviously, if this holds for all θ ∈ Θ, this is also true in expectation, that is
Eθ [v0 (x∗, θ)] ≥ Eθ
[
g˜i (x∗, θ) + tj (x∗, θ)− f0 (x∗, θ)
]
(58)
−Eθ
[
g˜i (x˜, θ) + tj (x˜, θ)− f0 (x˜, θ)
]
+ Eθ [v0 (x˜, θ)] . (59)
Observe that x∗ ∈ X∗{i} and x˜ /∈ X∗{i} together imply that Eθ
[
g˜i (x∗, θ) + tj (x∗, θ)− f0 (x∗, θ)
]
>
Eθ
[
g˜i (x˜, θ) + tj (x˜, θ)− f0 (x˜, θ)
]
, which in turn implies from (58) that
Eθ [v0 (x∗, θ)] > Eθ [v0 (x˜, θ)] .
The latter comparison says that x˜ /∈ X(t˜i, tj), a contradiction. Therefore, x˜ ∈ X∗{i}. 
A.6 Proofs of Lemma 1 and of Proposition 4.
Proof of Lemma 1. Consider xo ∈ X (toi , tj), a choice of the agent (the lab) when it faces principal
(firm) i’s strategy (contract offer) toi (x, θ), the other strategy tj (x, θ) remaining unchanged. Formally,
xo ∈ arg max
x∈X
{
Eθ
[
toi (x, θ) + tj (x, θ)− f0 (x, θ)
]}
.
We want to prove that xo cannot be distinguished from the action x˜, as chosen by the agent when
principal i’s strategy is t˜i (x, θ). That is, we want to establish that
xo ∈ arg max
x∈X
{
Eθ
[
t˜i (x, θ) + tj (x, θ)− f0 (x, θ)
]}
,
and that the strategy toi results in the same expected payoff to the agent and both principals.
(i) We first prove that x˜ leads to the same expected payoff to the agent when facing toi (x, θ) as when
facing t˜i (x, θ) so that principal i’s change of strategy from t˜i to toi should not result in the agent
turning down the new contract offer. Toward this aim, observe that vi (x˜, y˜, z˜, θ) = g˜i (x˜, θ)− t˜i (x˜, θ),
by definition, for all θ ∈ Θ. From inequality (21), we have
h (θ) + t˜i (x˜, θ) ≥ g˜i (x˜, θ)− g (θ) ≥ 0,
so that
vi (x˜, y˜, z˜, θ)− h (θ) = g˜i (x˜, θ)− [t˜i (x˜, θ) + h (θ)] ≤ g˜i (x˜, θ) ,
for all θ ∈ Θ. As a result
toi (x˜, θ) = sup {0, g˜i (x˜, θ)− [vi (x˜, y˜, z˜, θ)− h (θ)]}
= g˜i (x˜, θ)− [vi (x˜, y˜, z˜, θ)− h (θ)] ,
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for all θ ∈ Θ, and hence
Eθ
[
toi (x˜, θ) + tj (x˜, θ)− f0 (x˜, θ)
]
= Eθ
[
g˜i (x˜, θ)− [vi (x˜, y˜, z˜, θ)− h (θ)] + tj (x˜, θ)− f0 (x˜, θ)
]
= Eθ
[
g˜i (x˜, θ)− vi (x˜, y˜, z˜, θ) + tj (x˜, θ)− f0 (x˜, θ)
]
= Eθ
[
t˜i (x˜, θ) + tj (x˜, θ)− f0 (x˜, θ)
]
, (60)
where the passage from the first to the second equality is justified by the zero expected value of a
lump-sum transfer adjustment (equation (20)), and the passage from the second to the third directly
follows from the definition of principal i’s equilibrium payoff: vi (x˜, y˜, z˜, θ) = g˜i (x˜, θ)− t˜i (x˜, θ).
(ii) We now prove that xo, as chosen by the agent when facing toi , must be an element of
arg max x∈X
{
Eθ
[
t˜i (x, θ) + tj (x, θ)− f0 (x, θ)
]}
so that, for principal i, it is indistinguishable from the action x˜ chosen when the agent faces t˜i. To see
that, recall that by construction toi (x, θ) = sup {0, g˜i (x, θ)− [vi (x˜, y˜, z˜, θ)− h (θ)]} is truthful with
respect to x˜ as associated to the equilibrium payoff vi (x˜, y˜, z˜, θ)− h (θ) ≥ 0. Then, as established by
Lemma (A.5), truthful equilibria are (bilaterally) efficient so that it must be the case that
Eθ
[
g˜i (xo, θ) + tj (xo, θ)− f0 (xo, θ)
]
= Eθ
[
g˜i (x˜, θ) + tj (x˜, θ)− f0 (x˜, θ)
]
. (61)
It follows that
Eθ
[
t˜i (xo, θ) + tj (xo, θ)− f0 (xo, θ)
] ≥ Eθ [g˜i (xo, θ)− vi (x˜, y˜, z˜, θ) + tj (xo, θ)− f0 (xo, θ)]
= Eθ
[
g˜i (xo, θ) + tj (xo, θ)− f0 (xo, θ)
]− Eθ [vi (x˜, y˜, z˜, θ)]
= Eθ
[
g˜i (x˜, θ) + tj (x˜, θ)− f0 (x˜, θ)
]− Eθ [vi (x˜, y˜, z˜, θ)]
= Eθ
[
g˜i (x˜, θ)− vi (x˜, y˜, z˜, θ) + tj (x˜, θ)− f0 (x˜, θ)
]
= Eθ
[
t˜i (x˜, θ) + tj (x˜, θ)− f0 (x˜, θ)
]
,
where the inequality follows from the definition of the truthful strategy t˜i, the equality with the
second line follows from the linearity of the expectation operator, the equality with the third line
from equation (61), the equality with the fourth line uses again the linearity of the expectation op-
erator, and finally the bottom line follows from the definition of principal i’s equilibrium payoff
vi (x˜, y˜, z˜, θ).Thus, the agent’s expected profit, when offered t˜i by principal i and choosing xo, is at
least as high as the one earned by choosing x˜. Because the latter action maximizes the agent’s payoff
when offered t˜i by principal i, the inequality cannot be strict. Therefore,
Eθ
[
t˜i (xo, θ) + tj (xo, θ)− f0 (xo, θ)
]
= Eθ
[
t˜i (x˜, θ) + tj (x˜, θ)− f0 (x˜, θ)
]
. (62)
(iii) We now prove that, by offering toi rather than t˜i, principal i is not conceding more profit to the
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agent. Indeed, by definition, and using the linearity of the expectation operator again, we have
Eθ
[
toi (x˜, θ) + tj (x˜, θ)− f0 (x˜, θ)
] ≥ Eθ [g˜i (x˜, θ)− [vi (x˜, y˜, z˜, θ)− h (θ)] + tj (x˜, θ)− f0 (x˜, θ)]
= Eθ
[
g˜i (x˜, θ) + tj (x˜, θ)− f0 (x˜, θ)
]− Eθ [vi (x˜, y˜, z˜, θ)− h (θ)]
= Eθ
[
g˜i (xo, θ) + tj (xo, θ)− f0 (xo, θ)
]− Eθ [vi (x˜, y˜, z˜, θ)− h (θ)]
= Eθ
[
g˜i (xo, θ)− [vi (x˜, y˜, z˜, θ)− h (θ)] + tj (xo, θ)− f0 (xo, θ)
]
,
where the inequality follows from the definition of the truthful strategy toi , and the equality between
the second and third lines follows from equation (61). We also know that g˜i (xo, θ) ≥ g (θ) by defini-
tion (lower bound), and that g (θ) ≥ vi (x˜, y˜, z˜, θ)− h (θ) from the first inequality in (21), so
g˜i (xo, θ) ≥ g (θ) ≥ vi (x˜, y˜, z˜, θ)− h (θ) , (63)
and hence
toi (x
o, θ) = sup {0, g˜i (xo, θ)− [vi (x˜, y˜, z˜, θ)− h (θ)]}
= g˜i (xo, θ)− [vi (x˜, y˜, z˜, θ)− h (θ)] ,
for all θ ∈ Θ, then we have
Eθ
[
toi (x˜, θ) + tj (x˜, θ)− f0 (x˜, θ)
] ≥ Eθ [toi (xo, θ) + tj (xo, θ)− f0 (xo, θ)]
= max
x∈X
Eθ
[
toi (x, θ) + tj (x, θ)− f0 (x, θ)
]
,
which, by definition of a maximum, cannot be strict. Thus, there is no other efficient choice xo that
results in a higher payoff than x˜ when the agent is offered toi by principal i.
As we have already shown that the choice of x˜ implies the same payoff to the agent whether
offered toi or t˜i (see equation (60)), the agent cannot improve on its expected payoff when facing the
first strategy rather than the second.
(iv) From Lemma (A.5), because both strategies are truthful their associated choices are efficient, that
is the expected joint profit of principal i and the agent is a maximum and hence unchanged whether
the agent is offered toi (x, θ) or t˜i (x, θ). Since we have just shown that the expected payoff of the agent
is also unchanged, the one of principal i must also be unchanged.
Eventually, from the previous steps we obtain that, when offering the strategy toi rather than t˜i,
principal i still induces the agent to make efficient choices, and the expected payoffs to the agent
and both principals end up unchanged. However, from equation (63) we obtain that principal i’s
realized (ex-post) payoff is now given by vi (x˜, y˜, z˜, θ) − h (θ), whereas the one of the agent is now
equal to v0 (x˜, θ) + h (θ). 
55
Proof of Proposition 4. There are two possible cases to consider:
(i) Suppose first that g (θ) ≤ Eθ [g˜i (x˜, θ)− t˜i (x˜, θ)] for a subset of Θ with positive measure.
We define the set Θ (v¯) such that g (θ) ≤ v¯, with v¯ ≥ v∗i (so that it is a non-empty set), and the
function h : Θ→ R such that:
h (θ) =
{
−
[
g (θ)− vi (x˜, y˜, z˜, θ)
]
for all θ ∈ Θ (v¯) ,
vi (x˜, y˜, z˜, θ)− v¯ otherwise.
Then, the truthful strategy toi (x, θ) = sup {0, t˜i (x, θ) + h (θ)} is such that
toi (x, θ) =
{
sup
{
0, g˜i (x, θ)− g (θ)
}
for all θ ∈ Θ (v¯) ,
sup {0, g˜i (x, θ)− v¯} otherwise.
In equilibrium, the principal i realized payoff vi (x˜, y˜, z˜, θ)− h (θ) are
vi (x˜, y˜, z˜, θ)− h (θ) =
{
g (θ) for all θ ∈ Θ (v¯) ,
v¯ otherwise.
(ii) Suppose now that g (θ) > Eθ [g˜i (x˜, θ)− t˜i (x˜, θ)] for almost all θ ∈ Θ.
Let h (θ) = vi (x˜, y˜, z˜, θ)− v∗i , with v∗i = Eθ [vi (x˜, y˜, z˜, θ)], so that Eθ [h (θ)] = 0, and
g˜i (x˜, θ)− g (θ)− t˜i (x˜, θ) < g˜i (x˜, θ)− t˜i (x˜, θ)− v∗i ≤ g˜i (x˜, θ)− t˜i (x˜, θ) .
Then, from Lemma 1, the truthful strategy
toi (x, θ) = sup {0, g˜i (x, θ)− [vi (x˜, y˜, z˜, θ)− h (θ)]} = sup {0, g˜i (x, θ)− v∗i }
is a best-response strategy to t˜j, for the same equilibrium outcomes (x˜, y˜, z˜) and a realized equilibrium
payoff vi (x˜, y˜, z˜, θ)− h (θ) = v∗i which is independent of θ. 
A.7 Proof of Proposition 5.
First, Lemma A.1 extends to the case ∂
2 gˆi
∂x2i
≥ 0 (i = 1, 2). Indeed we have established in (48) that
∂2 gˆi
∂x2i
= 0 ⇒ dy
∗
j
dxj
= 0, and in (51) that ∂
2 gˆi
∂x2i
> 0 ⇒ dy
∗
j
dxj
> 0. This is sufficient to conclude directly that
d[gˆi(xi+y∗i (x),xj,y∗j (x))− fˆi(y∗i (x))]
dxj
in (52) has the same sign as
∂gˆi(xi+yi ,xj,yj)
∂xj
and
∂gˆi(xi+yi ,xj,yj)
∂yj
.
To extend Lemma A.2 as well, note that ∂
2 gˆi
∂x2i
≥ 0 (i = 1, 2) implies Nji∆ ≥ 0 in (55), because ∆ > 0
(from stability condition) and Nji ≥ 0 from ∂
2 gˆj
∂x2j
− ∂2 fˆ j
∂y2j
< 0 (second-order condition) and ∂
2 gˆj
∂x2j
≥ 0
(assumption in this proposition). Then there are only two possible cases:
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(i) If ∂
2 gˆj
∂xj∂xi
≥ 0 then ∂2 gˆj∂xj∂yi ≥ 0 also (model specifications). As
Nji
∆ ≥ 0, we obtain that the expression
between brackets in (55) is positive. Moreover, ∂
2 gˆj
∂x2j
− ∂2 fˆ j
∂y2j
< 0 (second-order condition) here implies
that− ∂2 gˆj∂xj∂xi
(
∂2 gˆj
∂x2j
− ∂2 fˆ j
∂y2j
)−1
≥ 0. Therefore, from (55) we have dy
∗
j
dxi
≥ 0, which is sufficient to conclude
directly that
d[gˆi(xi+y∗i (x),xj,y∗j (x))− fˆi(y∗i (x))]
dxi
in (54) is non-negative also.
(ii) If ∂
2 gˆj
∂xj∂xi
≤ 0 then ∂2 gˆj∂xj∂yi ≤ 0 also (model specifications). As
Nji
∆ ≥ 0, again the expression between
brackets in (55) is positive. Moreover, ∂
2 gˆj
∂x2j
− ∂2 fˆ j
∂y2j
< 0 (second-order condition) implies here that
− ∂2 gˆj∂xj∂xi
(
∂2 gˆj
∂x2j
− ∂2 fˆ j
∂y2j
)−1
≤ 0. Therefore, from (55) we have that dy
∗
j
dxi
≤ 0, implying that
∥∥∥ dy∗jdxi ∥∥∥ = − dy∗jdxi .
So, recalling that
∥∥∥ ∂gˆi∂xj ∥∥∥ ≥ ∥∥∥ ∂gˆi∂yj ∥∥∥ (model specifications in (6-7)), a sufficient condition for Lemma A.2
to be robust to the increasing R&D return specification is
dy∗j
dxi
> −1. 
A.8 Proof of industry profit maximization result in Proposition 6.
Recall from the model specifications in Section 3 that, in equilibrium, for any given pair of transfer
payment functions (t˜1, t˜2) we know that x˜ is an element of X(t˜1, t˜2) = arg maxx {Eθ [v0 (x(t˜1, t˜2), θ)]},
the set of external R&D choices that maximize the lab’s profit. We want to demonstrate that x˜ is also
an element of X∗{1,2} = arg maxx {Eθ [g˜1 (x, θ) + g˜2 (x, θ)− f0 (x, θ)]}, the set of external R&D levels
that maximize industry profit. The proof is a simple adaptation, in the notation of our model, of a
common agency efficiency result in Bernheim and Whinston (1986b, Theorem 2, p. 14).
We suppose that x˜ /∈ X∗{1,2}, and look for a contradiction. In equilibrium, the strategy t˜i is truthful
relative to the equilibrium choice x˜ for all θ ∈ Θ, that is t˜i (x, θ) = sup {0, g˜i (x, θ)− [g˜i (x˜, θ)− t˜i (x˜, θ)]},
all θ ∈ Θ, all x, implying that
g˜i (x, θ)− [g˜i (x˜, θ)− t˜i (x˜, θ)] ≤ t˜i (x, θ) .
This holds in particular for any given x∗ ∈ X∗{1,2}, so that g˜i (x∗, θ)− [g˜i (x˜, θ)− t˜i (x˜, θ)] ≤ t˜i (x∗, θ) ,
all θ ∈ Θ, i = 1, 2. Summing the latter inequality for the two firms, and subtracting f0 (x∗, θ) on each
side, leads to
g˜ (x∗, θ)− g˜ (x˜, θ) + t˜ (x˜, θ)− f0 (x∗, θ) ≤ t˜ (x∗, θ)− f0 (x∗, θ) ,
all θ ∈ Θ, where g˜ (x, θ) = g˜1 (x, θ) + g˜2 (x, θ), and t˜ (x, θ) = t˜1 (x, θ) + t˜2 (x, θ). By introducing
f0 (x˜, θ) on the left-hand side only, and reorganizing terms, we obtain
[g˜ (x∗, θ)− f0 (x∗, θ)]− [g˜ (x˜, θ)− f0 (x˜, θ)] + t˜ (x˜, θ)− f0 (x˜, θ) ≤ t˜ (x∗, θ)− f0 (x∗, θ) ,
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all θ ∈ Θ. Obviously, if this inequality holds for all θ ∈ Θ, it holds also in expectation, that is
Eθ [g˜ (x∗, θ)− f0 (x∗, θ)]− Eθ [g˜ (x˜, θ)− f0 (x˜, θ)] + Eθ [t˜ (x˜, θ)− f0 (x˜, θ)] ≤ Eθ [t˜ (x∗, θ)− f0 (x∗, θ)] .
(64)
Observe that x∗ ∈ X∗{1,2} and x˜ /∈ X∗{1,2} together imply that Eθ [g˜ (x∗, θ)− f0 (x∗, θ)] > Eθ [g˜ (x˜, θ)− f0 (x˜, θ)],
which in turn implies from (64) that
Eθ [v0 (x˜, θ)] = Eθ [t˜ (x˜, θ)− f0 (x˜, θ)] < Eθ [t˜ (x∗, θ)− f0 (x∗, θ)] = Eθ [v0 (x∗, θ)] .
The latter comparison says that x˜ /∈ X(t˜1, t˜2), a contradiction. Therefore, x˜ ∈ X∗{1,2}. 
A.9 Proof of v{0,1}0 = v
{0,2}
0 ≥ v∗0 = |e| in Proposition 8 (for e < 0).
Suppose that e < 0, and consider firm i’s two alternatives: if it acquires the lab, as an integrated entity
it earns Λ− v{0,i}j ; otherwise, as an outsider it earns v{0,j}i . The difference of the latter two payoffs is
firm i’s willingness to pay for the lab, which is equal to the one of firm j. Therefore, competition for
the acquisition of the lab implies that in equilibrium v{0,i}0 = v
{0,j}
0 = Λ− v{0,2}1 − v{0,1}2 .
Suppose now that firm i is the one that acquires the lab, while firm j remains independent, i, j =
1, 2, j 6= i. In the latter industry structure, the integrated entity {0, i} and firm j bargain over the
value generated by the acquired lab, with respective disagreement payoffs v ({i}) and vj. Firm j’s
payoff is thus
v{0,i}j = vj + wj
(
Λ− vj − v ({i})
)
, (65)
where from (30) firm j’s bargaining power is
wj =
v{1,2}j − v∗j
Λ− v∗1 − v∗2
. (66)
Given that v{0,i}0 = Λ− v{0,2}1 − v{0,1}2 , as established above, and using (65-66), we have
v{0,1}0 = Λ−
(
v1 +
v{1,2}1 − v∗1
Λ− v∗1 − v∗2
(Λ− v1 − v ({2}))
)
−
(
v2 +
v{1,2}2 − v∗2
Λ− v∗1 − v∗2
(Λ− v2 − v ({1}))
)
,
which, by reorganizing terms, can be rewritten as
v{0,1}0 =
(
v ({1})− v1
Λ− v∗1 − v∗2
)(
v{1,2}2 − v∗2
)
+
(
v ({2})− v2
Λ− v∗1 − v∗2
)(
v{1,2}1 − v∗1
)
.
Then, recalling that v∗0 = |e| = v ({1}) + v ({2}) − Λ, and that Λ = v{1,2}1 + v{1,2}2 , after a few
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steps we obtain that v{0,1}0 ≥ v∗0 if and only if(
v ({1})− v{1,2}1
|e|
)
[v1 + v ({2})−Λ] +
(
v ({2})− v{1,2}2
|e|
)
[v2 + v ({1})−Λ] ≤ 0. (67)
As the two added terms in (67) are symmetric, we focus on the first one:
(i) Consider the expression between square brackets. By definition ofΛ = maxx Eθ [g˜1 (x, θ)+ g˜2 (x, θ)−
f0(x, θ)], we haveΛ ≥ Eθ [g˜1(x∗2 , θ)+ g˜2(x∗2 , θ)− f0(x∗2 , θ)], where x∗2 ∈ arg maxx Eθ [g˜2 (x, θ)− f0(x, θ)].
Since v1 = Eθ [g˜1(x∗2 , θ)] and v ({2}) = Eθ [g˜2(x∗2 , θ)− f0(x∗2 , θ)], we have v1 + v ({2})−Λ ≤ 0.
(ii) Consider the numerator in the term between parentheses. From Proposition 3 we know that
v∗2 = Λ− v ({1}). Moreover, Λ− v∗1 − v∗2 = v∗0 > 0 implies from (29) that v{1,2}2 > v∗2 for all (ω1,ω2)
in (0, 1)2. It follows that v{1,2}2 > Λ− v ({1}), and it is sufficient to recall that v{1,2}2 = Λ− v{1,2}1 (the
lab makes no profit in the horizontal arrangement) to establish that v ({1})− v{1,2}1 > 0.
Therefore, (67) is always true, with a strict inequality sign wheneverΛ > Eθ [g˜i(x∗i , θ)+ g˜j(x
∗
i , θ)−
f0(x∗i , θ)], for some i = 1, 2, j 6= i. 
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Figure 1: v is superadditive (e ≥ 0), so the loci for v ({1}) and v ({2}) intersect inside the simplex. In the initial
equilibrium (point I), in expectation the firms fully appropriate industry profits (v∗1 + v∗2 = Λ), so the lab exactly breaks
even (v∗0 = 0). Should a firm integrate the lab at no cost, it would appropriate more industry profits (point A for firm 1, or
B for firm 2). However, competition in the equity market lowers firms’ payoffs to v{0,j}i , for i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i, and results in
the lab to appropriate a positive benefit, that is v{0,1}0 = v
{0,2}
0 > 0 (point V).
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Figure 2: v is strictly subadditive (e < 0), so the loci for v ({1}) and v ({2}) intersect outside the simplex. In the initial
R&D equilibrium (point I) the firms earn an expected profit v∗i = v({i}) − |e|, i = 1, 2, and the lab earns v∗0 > 0. By
agreeing horizontally to coordinate R&D outsourcing, the firms fully reappropriate industry profits (point H). Should a
firm integrate vertically with the lab, at no cost, it would increase profits (point A for firm 1, or B for firm 2). The bidding
contest to acquire the lab leads both firms to earn v{0,j}i , i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i (point V) in the equilibrium industry structure.
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